July Risk Barometer

MIDDLE EAST | COLOMBIA

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Escalation Window Rapidly Closing as Low-Intensity Conflict Returns to the Gulf

The United States (U.S.)–Iran ceasefire is effectively over as more frequent exchanges of fire are becoming the new baseline in the Gulf, raising the regional risk profile. The situation has moved away from a conflict-management approach back towards a phase of contained escalation. Despite Iranian commitments to provide safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz per the 17 June Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Tehran has repeatedly targeted ships that do not adhere to the Iranian (northern) traffic separation scheme. Iran declared the Strait closed on 11 July.

The U.S. started limited strikes to degrade Iran’s ability to influence the Strait of Hormuz on 08 July, before reinstating its naval blockade on Iranian shipping in the strait on 14 July. And late on 14 July, Axios reported that President Trump held a meeting to discuss a "massive offensive" in Iran that would go beyond current strikes around the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump later said in a Fox News appearance that next week the U.S. would strike Iran’s bridges and power plants. Due to the uncertainty and escalation potential, Global Guardian now recommends against non-essential travel to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries for the next two to three weeks.

• The short-to-near-term risks across the Gulf are not uniform. Oman, specifically Muscat, and Saudi Arabia continue to face the lowest risks, while Kuwait and Bahrain face the most acute risks. However, the entrance of the Houthis into the conflict threatens to increase risks to travel and assets in Saudi Arabia. The UAE and Qatar face elevated risks.
• Reevaluate and adjust business continuity, travel management, and evacuation plans to match the dynamic risk environment.
• Conduct tabletop exercises covering possible airspace closures and downstream economic impacts of a continued Strait of Hormuz shutdown.

Situation Report

On 08 July, the U.S. launched strikes on over 80 targets across southern Iran and around the Strait of Hormuz. The strikes came as a response to Iranian attacks on commercial ships transiting through the Strait. In parallel with the strikes, the U.S. also revoked a sanctions waiver on Iran, the only up-front “carrot” prescribed by the MOU. Iran retaliated by targeting U.S. military sites in Kuwait and Bahrain, and expanding strikes on U.S. assets to Jordan, Qatar, and Oman. Following the attacks, Iran accused the U.S. of violating the MOU, while U.S. President Donald Trump declared the MOU over and issued a formal notice to Congress that hostilities against Iran had resumed.

Over the last week, the U.S. and Iran have gradually increased the scope and scale of reciprocal attacks. While unverified, Iran has claimed that the U.S. has struck several infrastructure sites in southern Iran. On 14 July, Iran launched over 50 projectiles at sites in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, its largest attack, with 33 drones targeting Kuwait alone. Iranian strikes have caused visually confirmed damage to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, King Faisal Air Base and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain. Iran has threatened to attack the UAE's Fujairah pipeline and Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline if the U.S. blockade continues.

On 14 July, the U.S. reinstated a naval blockade on Iranian ports. The previous day saw the fewest Strait of Hormuz transits since June, with only three transits reported by Windward. War risk premiums for shipping are now surging to between 2%–6% of a vessel's value. The U.S. Navy had been issuing route guidance and, in some cases, escorting commercial ships through Omani waters since early May, helping facilitate the transit of 800 vessels through the Strait.

In Yemen on 13 July, a runway at Sana’a International Airport (SAH) was bombed, with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government claiming responsibility and the Iran-backed Houthis blaming Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni government said SAH was attacked to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air flight with Houthis returning from Iran from landing. In response, the Houthis detained an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at SAH and launched a ballistic missile and drone strike on King Khalid Air Base in Asir Province (southern Saudi Arabia) that were intercepted. Earlier in the day, a tanker was approached by six small vessels in the Gulf of Aden, 50 nm off the coast of Yemen.

Despite the increase in kinetic actions and President Trump publicly casting doubt on the diplomatic process, indirect negotiations between the U.S. and Iran have not been abandoned. The mediation trio of Pakistan, Qatar, and Oman is still holding separate talks with both sides. 

Analysis

The contest of control over the Strait of Hormuz is predicated on different understandings of the MOU. Iran now considers control over the Strait of Hormuz to be a key national interest, and it sees the U.S. escort mission as a violation of the MOU and as an affront to its authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is unlikely to accept any agreement by which it loses its perceived authority over the Strait. Not only does it view controlling the Strait and charging transit fees for its use as an economic asset, but it also sees authority over the Strait as a defensive asset to deter future aggression, and as a means to restore its regional hegemony over its neighbors. Iran therefore equates losing its leverage over the Strait with surrender and something that it cannot sell to its constituency.

The activation of the Houthi front opens the pathway to horizontal escalation. The Houthis retain the capability to attack Saudi oil and gas infrastructure and attack Red Sea shipping, threatening the de facto closure of the Middle East’s two maritime chokepoints.

Neither side appears intent on resuming full-scale war yet. Both the U.S. and Iran have largely refrained from targeting critical infrastructure. The only way to fully eliminate the Iranian threat to the freedom of navigation in the Strait is by seizing strategic locations along Iran’s southern coast and islands in the Gulf. The Iranian regime continues to assess that the Trump administration is deterred from deploying ground troops, fearing the political repercussions of U.S. casualties, and the global economic consequences just months before the November midterm elections.

The window for U.S. escalation is still open. The timing of the 03 November midterm elections in the U.S. plays a key role in administration decision-making. President Trump likely wants some form of resolution to come before September. Between logistics, planning, and deployment of assets, any invasion and occupation of Iranian territory will need to happen in August, if at all.

It is unlikely that air and naval power alone will defeat Iran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait. The administration has demonstrated a willingness and an ability to rapidly shift policy that it deems ineffective and with shipping in the Strait approaching March levels, it is possible that it makes one more military attempt to temporarily resolve the situation on more favorable terms. Escalation indicators include:

• U.S. or Iranian strikes on civilian infrastructure (power plants, commercial ports, oil and gas facilities, etc.).

• Deaths of U.S. service members or civilians in GCC cities from direct impacts.

• The inclusion of Israel in direct hostilities with Iran.

• A new U.S. logistical airlift.

LOOKING FORWARD

The situation remains highly uncertain. It is very likely that U.S. attacks against Iran and Iranian attacks against U.S. installations in Gulf countries will continue and intensify in the short term. With a looming decision point for Washington, several scenarios are possible:

• Targeted assassination campaign. The U.S. commences a campaign to eliminate hardliners within the IRGC seen as impediments to restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait, including its commander, Ahmad Vahidi.

• U.S. deploys expeditionary forces. The U.S. seizes parts of Iran's coastline and strategic islands to gain control over the Strait of Hormuz or Kharg Island (Iran’s main oil export facility). This could either be in response to a Houthi Red Sea embargo or initiated to break the current stalemate.

• U.S. targets Iranian oil and gas infrastructure. The U.S. could begin strikes against Iran’s most prized economic assets after President Trump issues an ultimatum for Iran to stop its attacks on shipping. It is likely that Iran would retaliate by targeting critical infrastructure in the Gulf.

• U.S. walks away. In this scenario, the U.S. agrees to stop its blockade in exchange for Iran ceasing attacks on shipping. For the Iranians to agree, the U.S. would also need to walk back efforts to assist ships transiting Omani waters instead of using Iranian waters.

Presidential Transition Signals Uncertain Start for Colombia's Next Administration

Short- and medium-term political risk in Colombia is increasing following right-wing Abelardo de la Espriella’s narrow presidential victory over left-wing Senator Iván Cepeda on 21 June. Outgoing President Gustavo Petro alleges electoral fraud, while de la Espriella has suspended the formal transition process and accused Petro of plotting a coup to remain in power. With both camps now planning competing demonstrations on Colombia’s Independence Day (20 July), the same day Colombia's Congress is installed, there are increased risks of street unrest, institutional paralysis, and a contested political transition.

• Businesses and travelers should anticipate large-scale political demonstrations in Bogotá, Medellín, and other major cities around 20 July and in the lead-up to the 07 August inauguration.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces. Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all future protest sites.

Situation Report

• On 21 June 2026, right-wing lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella defeated left-wing Senator Iván Cepeda in Colombia's presidential runoff. Both candidates represented sharply divergent plans for Colombia, especially regarding security policy. Starting on election night, Petro, Colombia's first leftist president, refused to recognize the electoral outcome, alleging that the vote was manipulated through "algorithms" and improper foreign financing. Election night riots broke out in Bogotá and Cali, with Cepeda supporters clashing with police and burning barricades, disrupting public transit the following day.
• While Cepeda formally conceded the election on 24 June, Petro has continued to press fraud claims, alleging that the electronic reporting system was manipulated. These claims run counter to Colombian electoral authorities and international observer missions, who have said the election was conducted transparently and fairly. Crucially, despite his rejection of the results, Petro has committed to leaving the presidential office.
• On 07 July, in response to electoral fraud claims, de la Espriella ordered his transition team to suspend Colombia's formal handover process, accusing Petro and Cepeda of a plan to "cling to power at all costs" via a "coup d'état." Petro's transition coordinator, Finance Minister Germán Ávila, reciprocated by suspending his side's participation, rejecting the coup allegation and the barrage of “insults and disrespect, slander and offenses” his side had received from the de la Espriella camp. While official transition meetings have been canceled, the Petro government directed ministries to keep responding to the incoming team's information requests.
• On 09 July, Cepeda accused de la Espriella of undisclosed ties to U.S. security agencies, and threatened a campaign of "civil disobedience" unless de la Espriella renounces his U.S. citizenship and abandons any effort to extradite outgoing President Petro to the United States. During his campaign, de la Espriella told a reporter he would sign an extradition order if the U.S. requested one, and he has separately signaled intent to prosecute Petro domestically. De la Espriella had announced on 06 July that his transition team's anti-corruption group had identified "hundreds of irregularities" in the outgoing administration and was already filing criminal, fiscal, and disciplinary complaints.
• Petro has announced he will move his farewell address forward to 20 July, Colombia's Independence Day. He has called for a nationwide mobilization that day to defend his administration's social reforms. Cepeda has also begun organizing parallel events.  

Analysis

Colombia's presidential transition has become increasingly contentious, with both the outgoing and incoming administrations abandoning the cooperative handover typical of Colombian presidential elections. Political tensions have already demonstrated their potential to spill into the streets. On election night, Cepeda supporters clashed with police in Bogotá and Cali, burning barricades, assaulting police facilities, and disrupting public transit. Although the violence remained localized and subsided within a day, it showed how quickly both supporters and opponents are willing to mobilize over disputed political developments. Petro's continued fraud allegations and calls for mass demonstrations, combined with Cepeda's threats of civil disobedience, increase the likelihood of larger and more sustained protests in the weeks ahead. The convergence of several politically significant events on 20 July further elevates the risk. Colombia's Independence Day will coincide with the installation of the new Congress, Petro's farewell address, nationwide demonstrations called by the outgoing president, and competing mobilizations by opposition supporters.

The election of de la Espriella was in large part a rejection of President Gustavo Petro's security strategy, particularly his "Paz Total" policy, which sought to reduce violence through negotiations with armed groups. Cepeda, Petro's political heir, pledged to continue and expand that approach. De la Espriella campaigned on a tougher security agenda centered on strengthening military and police operations, forcefully dismantling criminal organizations, ending negotiations with armed groups, and renewing security cooperation with the United States. That last point is especially contentious for Petro, Cepeda, and their supporters, who have long resisted what they view as U.S. interference and a violation of Colombian sovereignty.

Looking Forward

Political polarization stemming from sharply divergent views of Colombia’s path forward, especially regarding security policy, coupled with charged accusations from both sides, increases the likelihood of a period of competing public mobilizations through the 07 August inauguration.

• Colombia’s Independence Day (20 July) is likely to be a flashpoint. The day will bring together the military parade, the installation of the new Congress, Petro's farewell address and mobilization, and competing rallies from Cepeda's and de la Espriella's supporters. This convergence of rival demonstrations drives the elevated risk of localized clashes, road blockages, and transportation disruptions in major cities like Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali.

• While de la Espriella publicly called for the military to uphold their oath to the constitution and resist a hypothetical Petro coup attempt, a military intervention or delayed handover of power remains a low-probability outcome, given scant evidence that Petro aims to remain in power.

In the months following inauguration, tensions specifically tied to the disputed election results are likely to ease as the transition concludes and de la Espriella assumes the presidency. However, any concrete move to deliver on prior threats to pursue extradition and prosecution of Petro and members of his government would likely reignite mobilization on the left.

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