January Risk Barometer

Middle East | Russia-Ukraine WaR

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Iran Crosses U.S. Redline

The region is on edge following Iran’s violation of United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump’s red line of killing protesters. As the death count mounts and the anti-regime protests begin to weaken, the window for American action is closing. The uncertainty surrounding President Trump’s chosen response, along with the repercussions of U.S. military intervention, increases the regional risk profile.  

Global Guardian assesses that American strikes on Iran are likely in the coming days. 

• In-country travelers should avoid all protest sites and limit outdoor activities due to the potential for unrest and violence. Foreign nationals are advised to leave by land to Armenia or Türkiye.
• Out of an abundance of caution, Global Guardian recommends deferring non-essential travel to the region.
• Organizations with assets or personnel should monitor the regional political situation and access contingency plans.   

Situation Report

The ongoing demonstrations mark the largest protest movement in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, presenting the current regime with its most serious crisis since the Iran-Iraq War. The protests began nationwide on December 28, 2025, driven by economic stagnation, the depreciation of the rial, and chronic water shortages, reflecting growing discontent with the Islamic Republic. The situation escalated on 08 January, when citizens in Iran’s core cities followed the exiled Crown Prince Reva Palahvi’s calls to protest en masse. The regime responded with a near-total communications blackout, blocking outbound, landline, mobile, and internet communications, including jamming Starlink, and began using live fire against protesters in the major cities. Reports from 13 January suggest a resumption in some mobile communications.

Demonstrations have been reported in at least 111 cities across all 31 provinces, including Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Karaj, Zahedan, Kermanshah, Mashhad, Hamadan, Najafabad, Yazd, Nurabad, Fuladshahr, Ahvaz, Sabzevar, Fasa, Shirvan, Nahavand, Khorramabad, Lordegan, Firuzabad, Nishapur, Chaharbagh, Bandar Abbas, and Tabriz, among others. Regime forces used live fire, tear gas, and rubber bullets. Casualty estimates vary widely from 2,400 to 23,000, with hundreds of regime forces among the dead. Since the crackdown, protest activity has shifted from daytime to nighttime. The scale of protests has also declined due to mass killings, though localized demonstrations and activity in major cities are persisting.

Airspace access over most of the country, including the Tabriz and Tehran flight information regions, was restricted through at least 30 January, due to military drills amid ongoing nationwide unrest. Lufthansa, Austrian Airlines, Turkish Airlines, Pegasus Airlines, Emirates, flydubai, Qatar Airways, Kuwait Airways, Jazeera Airways, SalamAir, Air Arabia, AJet/AnadoluJet, Azerbaijan Airlines, and China Southern Airlines have cancelled flights through at least 18 January. Further flight cancellations and disruptions cannot be ruled out in the near term. The U.S., Canada, India, Australia, Cyprus, and other nations have issued warnings for their citizens to leave Iran. 

While the U.S. has deployed aerial assets, like air refueling tankers—such as KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46A Pegasus—alongside heavy transport aircraft C-17 Globemaster IIIs, there has been no observed U.S. Air Force or Navy offensive buildup over the last week. Reports indicate that a drawdown is underway with non-essential staff ordered to depart Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar by the evening of 14 January, and citizens and staff to limit non-essential travel to military sites across the region.

Timeline

• 28 December: Merchant strikes and shop closures in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar sparks protest movement.
• 02 January: President Trump publicly threatened to “intervene in Iran” if the regime continued killing peaceful protesters.
• 08 January: Mass protests follow the first-ever direct call by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi with nationwide turnout likely reaching millions. Authorities implement communications blackouts and begin a highly violent crackdown campaign.
• 09 January: Mass protests continue and grow in size in Tehran, Mashhad, and Qazvin. Authorities shut down schools in Tehran Province and East Azerbaijan Province. President Trump pledges that the U.S. would “hit them very, very hard where it hurts” if the regime started shooting protesters.
• 10 January: In his most recent call, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi urged protesters to prepare for taking over government buildings and key areas.
• 11 January: President Trump repeated that he had “put Iran on notice,” warning that if security forces fired on demonstrators, the U.S. would respond “very hard,” language echoed in interviews and remarks aboard Air Force One. It was also disclosed that a diplomatic channel was open.
• 12 January: A massive pro-regime rally is held in Enghelab Square in Central Tehran with upwards of 100,000 attendees. Non-essential French embassy staff leave Iran and U.S. State Department issues a security alert urging citizens to leave the country if possible or to shelter-in-place.
• 13 January: President Trump says all meetings with Iranian officials have been canceled until "the senseless killing of protesters stops” and says, "help is on the way."

• 14 January: The mayor of Dimona, Israel—the location of its nuclear research site—orders the opening of public bomb shelters in the city. Some U.S forces at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar are advised to leave, and the U.S. Department of State limits non-essential travel to regional military sites.

Analysis

In general, for revolutions to be successful, they require a confluence of social, psychological, and security factors. Namely, mass demonstrations in the political, economic, or cultural heart of the country, an inspiring and iconographic event (ruler fleeing, palace storming, etc.), and most importantly, large-scale defections among the security forces. While mass demonstrations in Iran’s capital and largest cities took place, the momentum is already appearing to wane due to the violent crackdown. None of the country's main institutions have been taken over and no large-scale defections have been reported. Absent of a major momentum shift, the protests cannot be sustained under the current levels of state violence.

The protests in Iran materialized at a time of maximum tension between Israel and Iran that followed Prime Minister Netanyahu’s December U.S. visit were he reportedly asked for a green light to attack Iran. While regime change is in Israel’s interest, overt action would be counterproductive. As such, Israel has reportedly decided not to overtly intervene and its security establishment has warned its ministers to refrain from making provocative remarks, signaling the real miscalculation risk.

The current window of opportunity presents U.S. decision makers with their best opportunity to achieve either their desired maximalist nuclear deal, hastening the end of the Islamic Republic, or further set back their nuclear or ballistic missile programs. But this window is closing rapidly. With President Trump’s repetition of his red line over the killing of protesters, he will face credibility risks going forward if no action is taken. The actions the U.S. will take will be predicated on one of these four desired outcomes.

Global Guardian assesses the probability of U.S. military intervention as likely and the probability of non-kinetic intervention as highly likely.

Non-Kinetic Intervention

• Cyber, information, and logistic operations to support protests
• Cyber-attacks on regime information networks and regime-affiliated media
• Providing protesters with Starlink systems to facilitate communication and information dissemination

Military Intervention

• Targeting of IRGC and Basij units responsible for killing demonstrators
• Targeting regional command and control centers coordinating the repression of protests
• Decapitation strikes targeting key regime or security forces leadership

The regime can’t meaningfully address the driving concern of the protests: falling living standards and government mismanagement. In past periods of unrest, the regime has been able to offer certain policy concessions or deflect blame between the hardliner and reformer camps. Whether or not this round of protests is quelled, the underlying economic crisis will continue, making further protests in 2026 likely.

Allied Commitments to Ukraine and the Prospects for a Ceasefire

Despite recent European financial commitments to Ukraine, defense production bottlenecks impede a large-scale increase in the delivery of military aid. Growing U.S. disinterest in the conflict has emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin despite slow and painful advances at the front; the military situation has not shifted far enough one way or the other to convince either Russia or Ukraine to shift from mutually incompatible demands. A ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia in their nearly four-year war remains out of reach for now.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding non-essential travel to Ukraine and Kyiv.
• We recommend firms with personnel in Kyiv or other cities in Ukraine monitor official government emergency communications and ensure that personnel know where the nearest air raid shelters are at all times.
• For firms with critical Ukrainian operations, we recommend beginning to consider relocating assets and personnel to sites other than Kyiv, if possible.

Situation Report

After localized Russian successes in Zaporizhzhia Oblast during September–November 2025, and the capture of the long-held Ukrainian stronghold of Siversk in December, Russian advances along the front have slowed considerably in recent weeks with the onset of harsh winter weather—a predictable development after nearly four years of war. With the frontlines returning to a near-stalemate, the focus of Ukraine’s allies has turned towards securing military and financial support for Ukraine in the months and years to come.

EU Council President Antonio Costa announced on December 16 that 90 billion euros ($105.5 billion) in aid will be allocated to Ukraine for 2026 and 2027, funded through borrowing by EU governments. This funding plan circumvents the contentious debate over whether to appropriate more than 210 billion euros worth of frozen Russian assets, a step that faced fierce opposition from Belgium—responsible for holding the assets—and several Central European governments.

Although the United States remains the single largest donor to Ukraine since the beginning of the war in 2022, aid from the U.S. has declined precipitously in 2025, with money from previous aid bills passed in 2024 mostly allocated by now. Future large-scale disbursements of aid to Ukraine are unlikely, given the major shift in geopolitical priorities implemented by the Trump administration.

ANALYSIS - Rhetoric Vs. Reality

The new EU loan to Ukraine can be counted as a diplomatic success for the country, which is projecting a $42 billion budget shortfall for 2026. While it matters little to Ukraine where foreign aid disbursements originate from, for Europe, the loan agreement is a Plan B. The failure of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s plan to seize 210 billion euros in frozen Russian assets for Ukrainian use exposes very real divisions among European states about how far to go in backing Ukraine, and increasingly for some, whether to do so at all. Aside from Belgian opposition to the proposal due to fear of legal repercussions, the rejection of the Central European states Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia stemmed from ideological grounds, with right-wing governments in those countries refusing to participate in the agreed-upon loan plan at all.

The gap between rhetoric and reality is perhaps even greater in the diplomatic realm; much has been made of proposed security guarantees for a post-war Ukraine. Zelensky has hammered this home as an absolute necessity for Ukraine to sign any peace deal, and a flurry of recent summits and negotiations between Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. appear to have carved out some progress on this front. But a closer examination of the proposals exposes severe limitations on their feasibility:

• German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced for the first time his willingness to allow German troops to participate in a peacekeeping force, but only if they are stationed in NATO states bordering Ukraine.
  • Given the unwillingness of Hungary and Slovakia to support Ukraine, they would have little reason to host German troops. Even if stationed in Poland or Romania, a small number of Bundeswehr forces would be unable to respond effectively to additional Russian attacks on Ukraine. 

• British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron announced their willingness to have British and French troops “establish military hubs” in western Ukraine in a post-war scenario.
  • The proposed ground force—no more than 10-15,000 troops in all— would be well west of the contact line and unable to respond effectively to a Russian ceasefire violation.
  • Other major European countries, such as Spain and Italy, have categorically refused to contribute troops to such a force. 

• U.S. commitments to firm security guarantees remain vague and poorly defined. The Trump administration remains extremely averse to the idea of contributing air or ground troops to a multinational force, believing instead that it can secure a credible deal between Ukraine and Russia, while Europe would field the risk and burden of providing troops.
  • Any proposed guarantees lose a great deal of force without the threat of U.S. military action.
  • Any proposed guarantees that involve NATO troops stationed on Ukrainian soil are a complete nonstarter for Russia under current military conditions.

Looking Forward – Trajectory of Ceasefire and Foreign Support

• Future European and U.S. support for Ukraine is contingent upon defense production bottlenecks as much as it is on financial assistance. Ukraine’s air defense network is currently oversaturated by continuous Russian drone and missile attacks, and the national grid is unable to cope with the extent of the damage.
  • Production lines for missile interceptors such as the Patriot system are currently insufficient to replace Ukraine’s expenditure and losses. Prospects for expanding defense production in the U.S. and Europe are currently hamstrung by labor force limitations.
  • The attritional nature of the war and drained military stocks in the U.S. and Europe means that future military aid to Ukraine will only be enough to sustain its existing defensive effort for the next two-to-three years, assuming the fighting continues.
• Current military conditions—gradual Russian advances at high human and material cost—are neither enough to persuade Putin that his goals in Ukraine are unattainable, nor enough to convince Kyiv that Ukraine cannot outlast Russia. As long as such conditions persist, a ceasefire remains a remote possibility.

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