Gaza evacuations underway amid 'trigger of violence' never seen before

“This can go on for weeks to months, if not years. This is a trigger of violence we have not seen and I think ultimately our message to the client base and the corporate sector and families is don’t risk it. It is time to get out.”

CEO Dale Buckner sat down with Yahoo News to discuss the Israel-Hamas war, including how Global Guardian is actively offering offering protection and evacuation aid to clients and their families. 

Israel invading Gaza could escalate the war into a larger regional conflict

"The trigger in our minds for all the dominoes to fall is for Israel to cross into Gaza."

Global Guardian CEO Dale Buckner sat down with Thibault Spirletof Business Insider to discuss the Israel-Hamas war, including how Israel's invasion of Gaza could turn the war into a regional conflict, with Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, and the US being sucked in.

“Ultimately, the message right now is move while we can.”

As Global Guardian works around the clock to evacuate clients and travelers out of Israel and the surrounding region before the situation deteriorates, NBC 4 Washington visited our 24/7 Operations Center to discuss how we are supporting clients on the ground now—and in past moments of crisis—with CEO Dale Buckner, COO Mark Post, and VP of Operations Spencer Tadken.

“We have two more ground missions scheduled in the next 16 hours and two more aircrafts going out in the next 24 hours either to Cyprus or Europe."

CEO Dale Buckner sits down with WJLA ABC 7's Carl Willis to discuss the current situation in the Middle East and share how Global Guardian is evacuating clients from Israel via ground and air as the conflict continues to evolve.

“The word easy doesn’t apply.”

In an interview on Mornings with Maria on Fox Business, Global Guardian CEO Dale Buckner discusses the Israel-Hamas war, sharing insight on Global Guardian's evacuation efforts in Israel as well as the potential difficulties in getting civilians to safety as Israel readies its ground offensives.

Hamas has issued a call for "Friday of al-Aqsa Flood" protests after Friday prayers tomorrow in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, al-Bireh, Nablus, Tulkarim, Tubas, Salfit, Jenin, and Qalqilya. Their likely goal is to rile up residents in hopes they clash with Israeli police, leading to casualties or fatalities furthering their narrative and to gain support from the broader Muslim world. Additionally, the former head of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal called for protests across the Muslim world on Friday in support of the Palestinians and for the peoples of neighboring countries to join the fight against Israel.

There are elevated concerns over potential for unrest and violence across the Middle East, North Africa, and major cities across the West following Friday prayers. Israeli and U.S. diplomatic outposts could be targeted, as well as synagogues and Jewish community centers. In the U.S., the FBI and local police departments, including the NYPD, have not indicated any specific threats but are advising vigilance as they continue to monitor the situation and prepare accordingly.

The following impact report is part of Global Guardian's 2024 Taiwan Shock Index. To explore and download the map, click here.

Sector Snapshot: Agriculture

Sectors Impacted Upstream: Fertilizer, farming equipment

Sectors Impacted Downstream: Food processing, food retailing, textiles

A Taiwan Strait Crisis would prompt severe and simultaneous shocks to both supply and demand in the agriculture sector. Over time, upstream substitutions could be found but the potential loss of the world's largest consumer of agricultural goods would radically alter the nature of the international food market and prompt a major shift in livestock and crop production. Highly developed nations can be expected to adapt more quickly but underdeveloped nations in the Global South can be expected to confront dire food insecurity.

Short-Term Impact – Highly Adverse

• China is the world’s largest producer of nitrogenic fertilizers, a major producer of farming equipment, and a key component of the global food processing supply chain. Two of the world’s other biggest fertilizer and food producers — Ukraine and Russia — are producing and exporting under capacity due to the war and sanctions. The loss of Chinese inputs to food production would raise costs for both farmers and consumers across the board.
• The loss of access to the Chinese market would lower revenues for Western, particularly American, farmers precisely at a time of increased costs for fertilizer and farming equipment — a double-sided shock to both supply and demand.
• The Global South would see increased food costs, exacerbating its current food insecurity challenge.

Medium to Long-Term Impact – Medium Adverse

• Other producers may be able to capitalize on the gap left by China in the global fertilizer market. Certain regions could see limited reshoring of the food processing industry.
• The potential for disruption in both the Chinese, as well as Russian and Ukrainian, components of the global food supply chain could lead to hunger in multiple regions throughout the Global South already contending with chronic food insecurity.
• Farmers will likely substitute livestock and crop types for more profitable use of arable land depending on market forces and subsidies.
• Depending on policy reactions, it is possible that the international food market is substantially de-globalized through a reorientation towards regional markets.

The following impact report is part of Global Guardian's 2024 Taiwan Shock Index. To explore and download the map, click here.

Sector Snapshot: Energy

Sectors Impacted Upstream: Hydrocarbons, coal

Sectors Impacted Downstream: Electrical, metallurgy, chemicals, consumer goods, clothing and textiles, construction, food processing, automotive, manufacturing

A Taiwan Strait Crisis would prompt a massive energy shock in the short term and would irrevocably alter the energy market. Seabourne imports from the Middle East to China, Japan, and South Korea — three of the five top global energy importers — constitute over half of the total global oil trade. The sea lanes through which the energy is transported would be contested in the event of a conflict.

Short-Term Impact: Moderately Adverse

• A Taiwan Strait Crisis would prompt an unprecedented global energy shock.
  • Major international crises trigger energy price shocks as the geopolitical instability and uncertainty of the situation are factored into the market. 
• Seabourne energy delivery to East Asia, and China specifically would be disrupted.
  • China, Japan, and South Korea are three of the world’s top five oil importers, constituting around half of the global oil trade. These nations are also major importers of LNG and coal.
  • Delivery of Middle Eastern oil and gas in the midst of a conflict at sea would be complicated, even if price shocks and sanctions are left out of the equation. If China engages in a blockade of Taiwan, shipping oil to China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and even the Philippines through the affected area may prove uninsurable to the point of non-profitability.

Medium to Long-Term Impact: Nuetral

• A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait could irrevocably alter global energy markets.
  • Western sanctions and the United States’ naval control over the Malacca Strait could disrupt China's oil imports. China will likely need to rely on Russia to secure its energy supply.
  • With China replacing Europe’s demand for Russian oil and gas and Russia replacing the Middle East’s supply of oil and gas for China, China and Russia could form a de-facto regional energy market with different market dynamics and little external oversight.
  • The existence of a parallel oil market with different prices would create an extremely lucrative space for smuggling and arbitrage.
• Depending on how long a conflict lasts, insurance costs for transporting oil to East Asia from the Middle East could rise precipitously. Taking a more circuitous route that avoids the Strait would also increase transportation costs.
• Should the Taiwan Strait remain uninsurable, North American (and Australian) energy exports to Japan and South Korea could become more attractive.

The following impact report is part of Global Guardian's 2024 Taiwan Shock Index. To explore and download the map, click here.

Sector Snapshot: Consumer Goods

Sectors Impacted Upstream: Raw materials (fabric, wood, metals, precious metals), and semifinished goods (textiles, furniture components, plastics, electronics)

Sectors Impacted Downstream: Retail, ecommerce, transportation and logistics

A decoupling with China would cause a major shock to the consumer goods sector hitting supply and demand and opening firms up to a number of legal, regulatory, and supply chain risks. The long-term impact of a Taiwan Strait Crisis largely depends on the policy response of the world’s major economies,  but major opportunities would exist for firms who enter markets previously dominated by Chinese manufacturers.

Short-Term Impact: HIghly Adverse

• Firms operating in China will likely face intense legal, regulatory, and logistical pressure to reshore or “friendshore” their production to other countries. There would likely be high up-front capital costs involved in relocating production and rebuilding institutional knowledge.
• Firms selling in the Chinese market would be impacted by sinking demand.
  • China’s unemployment problem — and overall economic rut — will be exacerbated by a Taiwan Strait Crisis, leading to a massive decrease in discretionary spending. China’s youth are both reliant on the medium-skill manufacturing jobs that would be lost and are the largest buyers of foreign consumer goods.
• Firms that rely on China for both production and consumption — such as cosmetics, over-the-counter medications, and packaged food products — may find themselves squeezed between increased production and capital costs and decreasing revenues simultaneously.

Medium to Long-Term Impact: Moderately Adverse

• The long-term impact largely depends on the policy response of the world’s major economies, particularly concerning sanctions and continued decoupling. It is possible — if sanctions and decoupling are maintained — that the situation never returns to the status quo ante-conflagration.
• No country has the infrastructure, labor pool, and middle-class growth at the scale necessary to replace China’s role in maintaining the availability of cheap consumer goods and demand for middle-range and luxury products.
• A long-term decoupling of the Chinese and global economies would result in a long-term elevation of the price equilibrium for most consumer goods.
• The permanent price elevation could allow firms to profitably enter markets previously cornered by Chinese manufacturers.
  • Certain Chinese-made consumer products may not face direct sanctions, but through supply chain disruptions, domestic and non-Chinese foreign consumer goods may become newly competitive.

The following impact report is part of Global Guardian's 2024 Taiwan Shock Index. To explore and download the map, click here.

Sector Snapshot: Mining

Sectors Impacted Upstream: Equipment manufacturers, energy, and transportation

Sectors Impacted Downstream: Metals, green energy, heavy industry, construction, and electronics

A decoupling with China would result in a supply shock in commodities that China imports, extracts, and refines. In the long term, higher prices and opportunities to expand domestic and African operations may arise.

Short-Term Impact: Moderately Adverse

• Companies that are engaged in joint ventures with Chinese firms will have to navigate a narrow path to avoid the legal consequences of sanctions and the economic consequences of divestment.
• A rapid decoupling would result in an immediate, extreme supply shock in commodities that China extracts and refines. China’s market dominance in rare earths mining and processing cannot be quickly substituted.
  • China is the world’s largest producer of more than 20 different metals and minerals, including zinc, gold, aluminum, lead, and most significantly, rare earths.
• Companies engaged in the mining of cobalt and lithium would likely see sustained price increases for those elements. The price increase for inputs such as mining equipment from China would not match or negate the increase in revenue from lost Chinese competition.  
• Firms with logistical or other services that could be offered to mining companies in Central and East Africa may be able to capitalize on the increased access Western companies may gain to important mineral deposits concentrated in these areas.  
• Companies engaged in the production or sale of consumer electronics, batteries (including electric vehicles) and green energy generation will be hurt in the short term by the decreased supply of precursor components and materials.
  • China conducts roughly 63% of all rare earth mining, 85% of rare earth processing, and 92% of rare earth magnet production.
  • Rare earths and their derivatives are critical in the production of semiconductors, small magnets, and other necessary components for batteries, smartphones, electronic controllers, communications equipment, etc.
  • China manufactures 80% of the world’s solar PVs.

Medium to Long-Term Impact: Neutral

• Chinese capital and logistical constraints and challenges may open the door for Western companies to expand in the African market.
• This shock could result in Western governments loosening environmental regulations to allow for more domestic mining operations.
•  Opportunities exist for companies to capitalize on potential Chinese exits from certain competitive metal markets.
• Decoupling could create sticky higher prices for rare earth metals.
  • The current affordability of these minerals and their downstream products rests on an effort by the Chinese state to capture the market. Prices will approach a new higher equilibrium in a decoupled environment.
• Commodities like copper, zinc, and nickel will see price fluctuations, as both supply and demand dynamics will be altered.
  • The new equilibrium price for these metals will depend largely on future trade, regulatory and environmental policy responses, and China’s ability to evade sanctions.