November Risk Barometer

Middle East | EcUADOR | MADAGASCAR

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Disarmament Woes Increase Conflict Risks

Tensions between Israel and Lebanon are rising as the prospects of disarming Hamas in the Gaza Strip are waning, despite the success of the initial phase of the ceasefire. Global Guardian assesses that while it is likely that major fighting in Gaza has concluded, it is possible that Israel will increase the scope and scale of its attacks on Lebanese Hezbollah in the short term, testing the post-November 2024 status quo.

• Global Guardian advises against all travel to Lebanon south of Sidon and cautions against travel to South Beirut and the Bekka Valley.
• Firms with operations in Israel and Lebanon should review business continuity plans in case of an uptick in hostilities.  
• Monitor media and government messaging ahead of all travel to Israel and Lebanon.

Situation Report

Lebanon
Israel has maintained routine strikes against Hezbollah's attempts to rebuild its infrastructure, conducting between 600 and 1,000 air strikes, predominantly south of Sidon and in the Bekaa Valley since the 27 November 2024 ceasefire that marked the end of a deadly conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The agreement committed both sides to halt hostilities and work towards implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon.

Hezbollah has refused to disarm and according to a recent Wall Street Journal report that cites Israel and Arab intelligence, Hezbollah is restocking rockets and anti-tank missiles via Syrian smuggling routes, its seaports, and domestic production. The organization has shifted its center of gravity to north of the Litani River. Hezbollah currently aims to maintain the continuity of its military rebuilding while avoiding actions against Israel that could cause further harm to its restoration efforts beyond existing Israeli damage.

Israel continues to maintain five military posts within Lebanon at strategic locations, including Jal al-Deir (Bint Jbeil district), Jabal Blat (near Ramieh, Bint Jbeil district), Labbouneh/Alma al-Shaab (Tyre district), Markaba-Houla road position (Marjayoun district), and Hamames Hill (near Khiam, Marjayoun district).

In August, Lebanon’s government approved a national disarmament plan placing all weapons under the Lebanese Armed Forces, but progress has been minimal, prompting Israeli officials to consider expanding operations as Hezbollah rebuilds its capabilities.

Gaza
The situation in Gaza remains in limbo stuck between phase I and phase II of the 29 September 20-point Gaza peace plan.

• Phase I: Israel pulls back to “yellow line” leaving it in control of 58% of the Gaza Strip, including Rafah, and parts of Khan Yunis, humanitarian aid is surged, the Egypt-Gaza border crossing is reopened, and hostages and prisoners are exchanged.
• Phase II: Hamas is disarmed, security is taken over by the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and the Israeli defense forces (IDF) withdraw further. Also provided in this phase is the training by Egypt and Jordan of a Palestinian police force and the creation of a council of independent Palestinian technocrats to run the day-to-day affairs of Gaza under international supervision.
• Phase III: Reconstruction begins with Arab and international funds. Also in this phase is the creation of the Board of Peace to oversee the governing and reconstruction of Gaza. This body will be chaired by President Trump.  

Hamas staunchly opposes disarmament, using the ceasefire period so far to rebuild its military infrastructure, publicly execute alleged collaborators, and reassert control in areas the IDF withdrew, clashing with Israel-backed clans and militias. In effect, the enclave has been divided in two: west Gaza, run by Hamas and host to the majority of the population, and east Gaza, controlled by the IDF and Gazan clans and militias backed by Israel.

The International Stabilization Force is expected to be Egyptian-led, with troops from Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Pakistan expected to participate. Major questions remain about both the ISF and reconstruction.

Timeline

• 05 September: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) presents the government with a plan for disarming Hezbollah in four location-based phases, following the President's call for militia disarmament.
• 29 September: President Donald Trump presents a 20-point Gaza peace plan alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• 10 October: Israel-Hamas ceasefire enters effect.
• 13 October: United States Special Envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrak, warns on X that “If Beirut fails to act, Hezbollah’s military arm will inevitably face major confrontation with Israel…”
• 16 October: The exchange of live hostages and prisoners is completed.
• 30 October: Israeli media reports that Israel is considering intensifying its attacks in Lebanon to respond to Hezbollah’s attempt to reconstitute.
• 01 November: United States Special Envoy to Syria and Lebanon said that expectations on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah are “unreasonable.”

Analysis

The disarmament for reconstruction concept in both Lebanon and Gaza is not yielding diplomatic results. Israel’s pressure strategy in Lebanon is now creating diminishing returns, with Hezbollah rearmament outpacing Israeli attempts to stop it.

Lebanon
The Lebanese government is stuck in a catch-22 situation where mistakes could produce either civil sectarian conflict or another round of conflict with Israel. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam both have publicly advocated for Hezbollah to be disarmed in the rest of the country and for the state to have a monopoly on force, and Aoun has opened the door to a formal peace agreement with Israel. Hezbollah argues that it must remain armed to defend against Israel. Israel maintains a small presence within Lebanon and continues to degrade alleged Hezbollah infrastructure, offering to cease if the Lebanese state disarms Hezbollah. Lebanon lacks the capacity and will to disarm Hezbollah. In this light, recent Israeli threats made in the media alongside U.S. pressure are likely meant to stop Beirut’s foot-dragging on Hezbollah disarmament.

• The end-of-year deadline for Hezbollah disarmament will serve as a flashpoint.
• It is possible that Israel expands its limited air campaign against Hezbollah by starting to strike more high-value targets, including in Beirut, before the end of the year.

Gaza
The ceasefire and “day after” plan is a flagship foreign policy initiative for the Trump Administration that sees it not only as a legacy project but as a cornerstone to reorienting the United States towards the Gulf Arab states and reviving the geostrategic India-Middle East Corridor and the Abraham Accords. However, all parties involved understand the importance of this initiative to the U.S. and, as such, are seeking to maximize their gains.      

Both the Gaza stabilization force and reconstruction projects are fraught with overlapping and countervailing interests. If the ISF force is meant to support Hamas’s disarmament and facilitate the transfer of power to an alternative Palestinian authority, it is unclear if any country is willing to take on the difficult task of enforcement, given Hamas’s refusal to lay down its arms. Similarly, with Hamas still in the political picture, possible reconstruction donors, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are reticent to fund the reconstruction of territory controlled by Hamas.

There are two scenarios going forward:

• Hamas might agree, superficially, to hand over its heavy weapons to Egypt for safekeeping while continuing to possess light arms and secretly manufacture new weapons in its tunnels. In this scenario, the ISF would not need to forcibly disarm Hamas and when the ISF’s mandate is complete, Hamas could reassert control over the strip.
• With Hamas’ refusal to disarm, the current yellow line becomes a quasi-border dividing Gaza in two. The ISF takes control over eastern Gaza and reconstruction begins in earnest while Hamas continues to control west Gaza and slowly residents from Hamas-controlled west Gaza will be let into reconstructed east Gaza.

Ecuador’s Diesel Protests Highlight Regional Unrest Risks

Ecuador cut its decades-old fuel subsidies on September 12, 2025, when President Daniel Noboa announced the removal of diesel subsidies, resulting in an immediate price hike and subsequent protests throughout the country. Similar policy changes by previous presidents, Lenin Moreno and Guillermo Lasso, had also provoked mass unrest and forced policy reversals. With Latin America’s general rightward political shift, austerity measures in countries including Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina may presage major unrest. 

• Global Guardian advises monitoring local policy changes that may trigger unrest, including the removal of fuel subsidies.
• Avoid protest activity. Government responses are often heavy-handed, deploying crowd control measures, including tear gas, or even live rounds in some cases.
• Travelers and organizations with business footprints in Latin America should monitor the changing political valence of the region. Depending on election outcomes, expect disruptions to sectors affected by budget cuts and subsidy removals.
• Utilize secure transportation, opting for professional drivers capable of maneuvering complex protests and traffic situations.

Situation Report

• On 12 September, President Noboa announced the elimination of diesel subsidies as part of his plan to reduce the nation's fiscal deficit. Facing diesel costs that rose 55% overnight, demonstrators and organizations, including the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), took to the streets to protest and announced sector-wide strikes, demanding the decision be reversed.
• For three weeks, protesters clashed with security forces in the regions of Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, Chimborazo, Bolívar, Cañar, Azuay, Orellana, Sucumbíos and Pastaza. Tensions peaked on 07 October, when demonstrators hurled stones at the convoy of President Noboa while in the southern town of El Tambo. The government claimed they were also shot at. Highways were blocked outside major cities, temporarily paralyzing the flow of transport and goods. Unrest was particularly pronounced in the rural Imbabura Province, where protesters burned vehicles and hurled rocks at police, who in response, deployed tear gas and arrested dozens.
• On 22 October, CONAIE announced in a video it was calling for an end to the strikes, citing government repression.

ANALYSIS

The fuel protests in Ecuador follow a pattern seen across Latin America for decades. Subsidies win votes in the short term, but the lost government revenue often requires fiscal tightening by a later administration, which can cause widespread protests and unrest. This process has been observed in Latin America many times over the last decade.

• In 2024, following Argentine President Javier Milei’s implementation of economic “shock therapy”, which included the removal of subsidies, slashing of government jobs and spending, and cancellation of infrastructure projects, thousands of Argentines took to the streets, demanding a reversal to the slew of budget cuts and slashing of economic support.
• In 2019, Ecuadorean President Lenín Moreno was quickly evacuated from the Presidential palace by the military as protestors and police violently clashed on Quito’s streets. Government buildings in Quito were burned, 1,200 protestors were detained, and hundreds of police and protestors were injured. Moreno was forced to walk back the fuel subsidy removal.
• In 2018, Daniel Ortega attempted to raise social security contributions while lowering payouts, an unpopular move that led to mass protests. Ortega cancelled the social security overhaul, but the protests had already spiraled out of control, as violent demonstrations expanded across the country while protestor demands widened in scope.
  

While the austerity protest reaction is a well-documented trend, rarely have so many right-leaning administrations—all with a stated focus on austerity—taken power concurrently. This regional realignment may provide the fertile ground for multiple austerity-related protest movements in the next 12 months.

Looking forward

Austerity measures, including subsidy cuts, are looming in Latin America as right-wing administrations have recently entered office, and with a new slate of candidates surging in the polls for upcoming elections.

• In October 2025, Argentine President Milei, outperformed expectations in the nation's midterm elections, which will likely encourage the president to push further with his economic austerity project.
• Bolivia recently elected center-right President Rodrigo Paz, who is echoing Milei’s push for cutting government spending. Bolivia is the nation with the third-highest spending in the region on energy subsidies as a percentage of GDP and is already struggling with fuel shortages, which have sparked some protests.

Current polling suggests the following months will further the region's rightward shift. Across Latin America, voters say that ailing economies and spiraling insecurity are their key concerns; two issues that typically push voters to select right-wing governments.

• In Chile, escalating criminal threats and numerous failed constitutional referendums caused voters to gradually sour on the left-wing administration of former student organizer President Gabriel Boric. His successor, Jeannette Jara, is currently polling at 27%, with several right-wing candidates closely behind. With no clear path to a majority vote on November 16, Chile’s election will go a second round in December, which will combine right-wing voters behind either Jose Antonio Kast, or libertarian Johannes Kaiser.
  
  

Gen-Z Madagascar Revolution Indicates Movement Growth

On 13 October 2025, Madagascar’s President Andry Rajoelina was removed from power, joining former prime ministers Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh and K. P. Sharma Oli of Nepal in a growing cohort of leaders deposed by youth-led protests. Since 25 September, 22 people have been killed and hundreds more injured in clashes between protesters and security forces. The unrest ultimately subsided following the military’s defection and the installation of an interim government. Madagascar will likely remain stable in the medium term, but long-term stability—for Madagascar and other countries impacted by Gen-Z led protests—depends on whether the new regimes can achieve the legitimacy their predecessors lacked.

• Global Guardian recommends firms conduct pre-travel risk assessments when operating in Madagascar or other politically volatile locations.
• Have contingency plans in place for the timely exfiltration of personnel in the event of rapid escalation of unrest or political violence.

Situation Report

On 25 September, following calls for mobilization by opposition leaders, major demonstrations began in Madagascar’s capital, Antananarivo. Malagasy protesters cited the government’s failure to provide basic services, while still allocating funding for high-profile development projects. Protesters in Madagascar also sported symbols explicitly referencing previous global “Gen-Z protests,” including flags and hats from the anime series One Piece.

The Rajoelina government responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, live ammunition, and appeals for dialogue. Fewer than three weeks after protests began, the unrest catalyzed a military coup by a military unit called CAPSAT—short for the “corps d'administration des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques.” CAPSAT, under the command of current interim president Michael Randrianirina, took control of the country on 13 October. Rajoelina fled that same day. Of note, Andry Rajoelina originally came to power in 2009 the same way he left in 2025: at CAPSAT’s behest.

Timeline

• 25 September: Thousands of protesters gather at Ambohijatovo in Antananarivo.
• 08 October: Rajoelina offers dialogue with protesters, which is rejected citing the security response.
• 12 October: An elite Malagasy military unit—CAPSAT—publicly disobeys orders to fire on protesters and mutinies.
• 13 October: CAPSAT seizes control of the military and President Rajoelina flees the country.
• 17 October: CAPSAT’s commanding officer, Col. Michael Randrianirina, is inaugurated as interim president.
• 20 October: Randrianirina appoints a prime minister with connections to the previous administration, spurring Gen-Z criticism.

Analysis

Madagascar’s unrest is illustrative of a pattern of political turmoil emerging across the world—but particularly in the global south. The basis for a Gen-Z uprising is the government’s long-term failure to provide basic services. In Madagascar, this quality was fulfilled by regular water and electricity outages.

A second condition common to Gen-Z movements is the perception of inequality and corruption—often embodied by a foreign investment, acquisition, or concession. The Malagasy Gen-Z demonstrators explicitly cited corruption in the form of a high-budget, French-backed cable car project, several stations of which were set alight during the unrest.

Thirdly, youth-led protests are increasingly being coordinated and formulated in online forums such as Discord, which Nepal used to elect its interim government, or Facebook, where Madagascar’s protests were organized in large part.

Finally, Gen-Z protests are increasingly cohering around a shared identity expressed through a set of symbols taken from popular media, with references to the anime One Piece acting as the unifying face for an otherwise leaderless and loosely organized set of movements.

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