ISRAEL & WEST BANK | MALI | URUGUAY

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

West Bank Instability Points to Worsening Ground Conditions and Underscores the Increasing Likelihood of MulTi-Front War

On 03 July, Israeli forces launched a large-scale counterterrorism operation targeting militants in the West Bank city of Jenin. The operation involved over 1,000 soldiers and fighting marked the most significant flare-up between Israel and Palestinian militants since 2022, and Israel's largest operation in the West Bank since 2005. This round of violence is not isolated and is not over. Overall, the limited Israeli campaign indicates a shift in the Israeli security paradigm, one that presages heightened conflict risk in the medium term.

Starting at approximately (01:00) local time and lasting around 48 hours, the raid saw a significant number of Israeli airstrikes, some using drones and helicopters and a combined brigade of ground forces. The clash resulted in seven Palestinian deaths, over 90 Palestinian injuries, and eight wounded Israeli soldiers, including one fatality. The stated target of the operation was a “joint war room” for the Jenin Brigade, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that this will not be the last Israeli operation in Jenin.

• Global Guardian recommends against travel to the West Bank cities of Jenin and Nablus.
• We recommend pre-trip intelligence prior to all trips to Israel.
• This event highlights the increasing medium-term conflict risk in the Middle East.

Context

Owing to the weakness and unpopularity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) – (80% want President Abbas to resign) – a major paradigm shift in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict occurred in June 2021 when Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Jenin commander Jamil al-Amouri and two Palestinian security forces officers were killed during an Israeli raid. In the ensuing year, Iran saw an opportunity to capitalize on the situation and began to increase its support to its Palestinian partners.

Last year’s cyclic violence drove a chain of events that produced another Israel-Gaza war in August 2022, an Israeli decapitation operation of PIJ leadership in Gaza in May 2023, and the largest uptick in terror attacks within Israel, corresponding with more Palestinian deaths than any other point since the Second Intifada. The Palestinian Streets now overwhelmingly believes that armed “resistance” is a viable way of achieving both statehood and the dissolution of Israel, two aims that are inextricably linked.

Meanwhile, after a seven-year hiatus, rockets ostensibly launched by Palestinian factions in Southern Lebanon – but with the tacit consent, if not direct orders from Hezbollah – have been fired into Israel on several occasions in the last two years (most notably on 06 April when 34 rockets were fired in the largest salvo since the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War). These attacks highlight the increasingly tight relationships between various Palestinian militant groups and Tehran. More importantly, rocket attacks from Lebanon have now become normalized, cementing the linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the shadow war between Israel and Iran. Iran has now managed to cement the link between flare ups in West Bank and its broader campaign to eliminate Israel.

Recent Events

• 19 June – An Israeli military vehicle is severely damaged in a complex ambush in Jenin, resulting in a major shootout that necessitated the dispatch of an Israeli Apache helicopter to cover the extrication. This incident marks the first time an Israeli attack helicopter was deployed in the West Bank in over 20 years.  
• 20 June – Two Palestinian gunman shoot and kill four Israelis at a gas station in the Eli settlement, near Nablus, West Bank.
• 20 June – Israeli settlers set homes, cars, agricultural fields, and an ambulance ablaze in areas of Nablus governorate, West Bank, including Huwara and Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya.
• 21 June – A mob of extremist Israeli settlers kill one Palestinian, injure nine others, and set fire to at least 60 vehicles and 30 residences in Tumusai'ya, Ramallah, West Bank.
• 21 June – IDF drone strike targets PIJ and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade militants in a vehicle north of Jenin, West Bank for first time since 2006.
• 24 June – Israeli security forces thwart a terror attack at Qalandia Checkpoint outside Jerusalem; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claim responsibility.
• 04 July – A combined car-ramming and shooting attack injures 10 in Tel Aviv.
• 06 July – Rocket launched from Lebanon targets northern Israel; Israel responds in kind.
• 09 July – Israeli police foil stabbing attack at Giv'at Hatahmoshet light rail station in Jerusalem.

Analysis

Israeli security operations in the West Bank undermine the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy and in turn, contribute to the strengthening of Iran’s Palestinian partners, namely Hamas, PIJ, and Lion’s Den (whose fighters hail from various Palestinian factions, including Fatah’s armed wing). Yet as these various Palestinian militant groups increase their hold on the cities of Jenin and Nablus in the vacuum left by a weakened PA, they come closer to developing local weapons manufacturing that will ultimately culminate in the West Bank becoming another platform for which Iranian-assisted groups can launch rockets into Israel. But as opposed to Gaza, Southern Lebanon or Syria, the West Bank is within the Israeli heartland and no sophisticated missile defense system would be able to prevent rockets falling on Israel cities – and Israel’s sole major international airport, Ben Gurion (TLV) – from just a stone's throw away. Therein lies the dilemma: Israeli raids – necessitated by proximate security issues and the preservation of deterrence – create the conditions, namely increased support for the militant factions, that will necessitate future raids. Yet with every operation, the risk that Iran elects to open a multi-front war on Israel increases.

This latest military operation was as much about signaling to Iran and “reestablishing” deterrence as it was a response to the worsening security situation in the West Bank after the 19 June ambush on Israeli forces. Prima facie, one might conclude that mutual deterrence offers a stabilizing regional dynamic. Afterall, in the last half year or so, the Saudi/Emirati/Egyptian-Qatari rift has been mostly resolved, Syria-Arab League normalization is underway, and China brokered a diplomatic détente between Saudi Arbia and Iran. However, the opposite is true. The more Iran tightens its “ring of fire” around Israel and the more the Sunni Arab states prepare for a nuclear threshold state in Tehran, the more cornered Israel will become. And owing to Israel’s persistent existential threat and the legacy of the holocaust, Israel has set a precedent of taking unilateral military action in such circumstances.

Security to Decline Following UN Pullout Request

On 30 June, the United Nations (UN) Security Council formally voted to withdraw its 13,000 peacekeepers from Mali. The vote follows the Malian military junta’s request for the UN to withdraw. Having expelled French forces last year, the UN withdrawal will leave the military-run government with no state backing in a tough fight against Tuareg separatists and jihadist al-Qaeda affiliates who control large swaths of the northern part of the country. Instead, the junta has chosen to rely on the – now tenuous – support of the Wagner private military company. The UN withdrawal will likely result in a resurgence of jihadist forces in the north of the country and a further destabilization of the region.

The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) set a 31 December deadline to conduct an “orderly and safe” withdrawal from Mali. After MINUSMA has fully drawn down, the only force in Mali other than the Malian military will be the roughly 1,000 Wagner fighters stationed there. The swapping of UN and French security assistance to Wagner is motivated by desire to clamp down on domestic opposition ahead of elections slated for February 2024 without any form of international oversight.

• Global Guardian forecasts a decrease in stability and security; and advises those with assets in Mali to start devising evacuation plans for in-country personnel.
• Avoid all non-essential travel to Mali, particularly outside of Bamako.
• For essential travel in Bamako, use low-profile protected vehicles and executive protection.
• The proposed February 2024 elections may serve as a flashpoint event.

Context

The Junta, who took power in 2020 and 2021 coup d'etats, has come to rely more and more on the suite of security services offered by Condor Group (Wagner’s parent company). The services offered by Condor are not limited to providing mercenaries but extend to information warfare, political technology consultants, and the harassment or murder of journalists. Condor and Wagner’s presence in Mali was a major source of tension with MINUSMA and the French missions. UN officials have criticized the Malian government as having shortsightedly chosen regime security above national security.

Event Timeline

• April 2012 – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – a Tuareg separatist movement – and Jihadist-associated Fulani militias seize an area the size of France in northern Mali
• January 2013 – France launches a military intervention that stops the southward advance of the Jihadists and separatists (who had turned on one another)
• 2013 – MINUSMA intervention force is deployed
• 2015 – UN-orchestrated peace deal, the Algiers Accord, is signed between the MNLA, other separatists, and the Malian government
• 2020 – Military coup overthrows provisional government
• 2021 – Second military coup solidifies Junta control
• 2021 – UK, Germany, and Sweden withdraw from MINUSMA
• January 2022 – Wagner Group fighters begin to arrive
• 2022 – France withdraws from Mali, largely due to increased Wagner presence
• February 2023 – Mali votes not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
• June 2023 – UN votes to recall MINUSMA

LOOKING FORWARD

While Wagner fighters are often quite effective, they also have a history of human rights abuses in Mali and lack the air support, heavy weapons, and numbers necessary to provide the same level of security as the 13,000 strong MINUSMA mission. The 2015 Algiers Accord peace deal brokered by the UN with the Tuareg separatists is not likely to hold under Wagner. A coalition of separatist groups called Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) already pulled out of talks stemming from the Accord in late 2022. Should the Algiers Accord fail, the Tuareg groups will likely attempt to secure their hold on territory in the north. They may even seek some accommodation with their former allies, the largely Fulani Jihadist groups.

Previous advances by the Jihadist Jama’at Nasr al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) resulted in Timbuktu falling and advances towards Bamako. The resumption of fighting between the government and Tuareg forces could leave the door open for even further advances by JNIM. The Jihadist groups for their part could use the chaos of the upcoming 2024 election, and the Junta’s attempt to use force to subvert it, as an opportunity to galvanize support and advance south. The 1,000 Wagner fighters are not sufficient to protect against these advances and the Malian state may approach collapse.

The Junta made its decision to rely on Wagner at a time when Wagner could be reasonably interpreted to be acting with the approval and backing of the Russian state. Following Evgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny late in June, this assumption is now in question. Despite public assurances from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov that Russia will stand by its allies in Africa, it is unclear the extent to which the arms of the Russian state are willing or capable of filling Wagner’s shoes. Wagner fighters are rumored to have been drawn down in Syria and Central African Republic.

Drought leads to water Crisis in Montevideo

A multi-year drought in Uruguay has led to a water crisis impacting the capital Montevideo, putting more than 1.6 million people at risk, and raising concerns over future hazards from drought and water shortages as the earth continues to warm. The shortage caused authorities to begin mixing brackish water from the Rio de la Plata estuary with dwindling fresh water supplies, triggering warnings to those with kidney disease, high blood pressure, and other issues. In June, thousands of people took to the streets of Montevideo to protest the water shortage and mixing of salty brackish water into drinking supplies. The government is attempting to mitigate the risks by importing bottled water, drilling wells, and constructing new reservoirs.

• Global Guardian advises against drinking the tap water in Uruguay and recommends monitoring the availability of bottled water prior to travel in the short term.
• Ongoing shortages could lead to severe water rationing in households and business for bathrooms, kitchens, laundry, etc.
• Serious unrest is possible should the water crisis escalate.

Context

Uruguay is in the midst of a historic multi-year drought, with high temperatures and limited rainfall culminating in a water crisis in the capital region. Water levels in the Pasa Severino reservoir are at just 10% of capacity according to the Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE). Periodic rainfall will not be enough to replenish the reservoir. At least two inches of water per day over a 30-day period are required for water levels to recover. In addition to the drinking water crisis, farmers are struggling with declining crop yields and livestock problems.

The government has taken the following steps to mitigate the crisis:

• Importing more than $12,000,000 a month in bottled water for residents of the capital region
• Eliminating the tax on bottled water
• Purchasing multiple 150,000-liter desalination plants to be used for hospitals and other critical locations
• Digging new wells in Montevideo
• Evaluating a new reservoir project on the San Jose River

There have been multiple protests against the government’s handling of the water shortage, with some blaming ranchers and others accusing “exploitative” industries for using too much water.

Looking Forward

On 06 July, Uruguay’s Congress unanimously approved the Water Emergency Fund to finance access to bottled water among other measures. On 08 July, Argentine President Alberto Fernandez offered help to Uruguay in the form of a mobile water treatment plant, supplies, and personnel. Uruguay’s President Luis Lacalle Pou thanked his counterpart but turned down the offer for the moment, claiming the situation was dynamic and that it had recently rained. Without serious rainfall, the water crisis will continue, and the government will be forced to buy bottled water for the entire capital region.

Mexico rated among world’s most dangerous countries

"Tulum is the most obvious example where you see violence erupt as people are fighting for the street retail sales of the drug trade, folks who are selling drugs to tourists. That’s a change we’ve seen in the past couple of years."

Director of Intelligence Michael Ballard sits down with Border Report to discuss what makes Mexico one of the most dangerous countries in the world according to Global Guardian—and why travelers need to be prepared should they encounter a security incident.

Video shows Russian Troops' Dnieper Showdown With Advancing Ukraine Forces

"The idea here is more of a shaping operation and less of an immediate indicator foreshadowing a large-scale cross river with armor."

Global Guardian Senior Intelligence Analyst Zev Faintuch discusses Ukraine's advances at the Dnieper River and the potential implications on the Russia-Ukraine war.

High-net-worth, high risk: travel risk management for HNW clients

“The easiest way to convince your client not to implement security measures is to have it become intrusive in their life or an inconvenience. Security needs to be built around the lifestyle of the individual and/or family. They should not have to conform to the security; it’s the security procedures and mitigation that need to conform to the client."

In the July edition of the International Travel and Health Insurance Journal (ITIJ), SVP of Strategic Solutions Michael Coleman discusses how Global Guardian approaches security for high-net-worth executives and their families—building tailored programs around the client that address all threat vectors present while traveling, including medical emergencies, kidnap, ransom, and extortion events, and security crises of varying degree.

As Wagner troops marched on Moscow, Ukraine made further gains

“There’s still other players in the game of thrones in Moscow that are waiting and watching."

In Al Jazeera, Global Guardian Vice President of Client Risk Management Seth Krummrich weighs in on the events surrounding the recent coup attempt by Wagner Group Leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, why it suddenly ended, and the potential effects on Putin's leadership.

Seven Unanswered Questions About Prigozhin's Wagner Rebellion

"We can infer that Wagner is just too valuable to the regime to be disbanded completely. Wagner is vital for promoting Russian influence in Africa and the Middle East, as well as for sanctions evasion."

In an article by Brendan Cole for Newsweek, Global Guardian Senior Intelligence Analyst Zev Faintuch provides answers to some of the questions swirling around the recent rebellion by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.

'Final act of Putin's reign': Details of chaotic Russian coup emerging. Live Updates

"We’ve all seen gangster movies when the don shows weakness, and we all know what happens next. That said, it is still far too soon to predict Putin's imminent fall."

In USA Today, Global Guardian Senior Intelligence Analyst Zev Faintuch weighs in on the recent rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the notorious Wagner Group and its potential impact on Putin's reign.

A New Approach to Building Enterprise Security

“As the global threat environment becomes more complex, providing each and every employee with duty of care and protecting them from threats can no longer fall solely upon a Chief Security Officer (CSO) or any one department within the organization.”

In an op-ed for Security Technology Executive Magazine, Global Guardian CEO Dale Buckner discusses the importance of a collaborative approach to security within an organization—and what two main components are essential to obtaining buy-in across departments.

Ukraine | SENEGAL | Kosovo & Serbia

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

War Enters New Phase Replete with Escalation Risks  

The start of June ushered in a new phase of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict creating geopolitical uncertainty and elevating the prospects of escalation risks. In Russia, Ukrainian and Ukrainian-affiliated groups have stepped up attacks. In Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) ostensibly began its much-anticipated summer offensive in Zaporizhihia and Donetsk Oblasts leveraging some of its new Western hardware. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is readying the deployment of tactical nuclear warheads to Belarus set for July delivery and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is taking its first steps to subordinate the Wagner Group.

In what appears to be an intentional demolition, on 06 June, the Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed in a move to ostensibly consolidate Russian lines and prevent Ukraine from mounting cross-river landings in Kherson Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. On 07 June, the AFU launched a major push in its counteroffensive against Russian forces across an approximately 150km long front on three axes: the Vuhledar axis, the Velyka Novosilka axis, and the Orikhiv axis. The presumed intent of the counteroffensive is to break Russia’s land bridge which spans from Rostov-on-Don to Crimea along the Sea of Azov. This surge marks the most combat activity since the summer of 2022.

In the first four days of the operation, the Ukrainians liberated more than 60 square kilometers of territory.

• Global Guardian continues to advise against non-essential travel to Ukraine.
• Travelers to Russia may face the risk of arbitrary detention.
• More nuclear brinkmanship can be expected though the risk of first use is still low.

From The Wall Street Journal

Recent Events

• 11 June – Yevgeny Prigozhin, the financier of the Wagner Group, announced that he had received an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to place his forces under the command of the Russian military.
• 06 June – The Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed. The resulting flooding of the Dnipro inundated dozens of villages and altered the strategic landscape of the counteroffensive.  
• 04 June –  The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) – two Russian partisan groups – launched another raid into Belgorod Oblast centering on Novaya Tavolzhanka.  
• 01 June – The RDK and LSR launched a raid into Belgorod Oblast centering on Novaya Tavolzhanka and Shebekino.  
• 30 May – Ukraine launched a drone attack on various locations in Moscow. The attack was allegedly directed at high value targets in the upper class Rublyovka neighborhood. 

Analysis

The war is now entering its fifth phase and most important phase. The first four phases comprised Russia's ill-fated attempt at regime change at the start of the war, an attritional artillery campaign in the Donbas, Ukraine’s two-pronged counteroffensive in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and the reconstitution of both forces: Russia conscripted, trained, and dug-in while maintaining pressure focusing on Bakhmut; and Ukraine received tanks, artillery, and air defenses and were trained how to use them.

The stakes are high for both sides as Ukraine needs to prove to its Western benefactors that all the military aid is moving the needle and can facilitate Ukraine achieving its strategic goal of breaking Russia’s land bridge. Failure in the counteroffensive will have dire consequences for the Zelensky regime in terms of the scope of future aid and the political future of the current cast of disparate actors leading Ukraine. Meanwhile, the regime in Moscow is highly brittle. Should failures continue to compound, and fissures widen between the Ministry of Defense and Wagner, the cast of oligarchs whom President Putin presides over may turn their sights on each other.

Looking Forward

We can expect the following in the near-term:

• Nuclear threats – Through the formal annexation of Ukrainian territory, the legal justification for the “defensive” use of nuclear weapons is in place. Russia is set to station tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus, presumably to be loaded onto missiles or bombers to threaten Kyiv. The devices will also place much of eastern Europe in range. We can also expect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to come under threat in false flag attacks or to draw fighting into the area to create an international incident.  
• More subterfuge within Russia – More sabotage acts, drone attacks, and more Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) cross-border raids in western Russia.
• Slow progress – This is an attritional war occurring in a large country where most of the war has been characterized by logistical difficulties and artillery/trench warfare almost reminiscent of WWI. Rapid breakthroughs will not happen overnight – especially since the skies are contested – and most of Ukraine’s offensive potential is still waiting on the sidelines, ready to exploit any weaknesses exposed in this initial thrust.
• Salt the Earth Behind You – Russia has pivoted from its winter strategy of denying Ukraine heat by attacking Ukraine’s power grid to attacking food production. The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam may be the start of a campaign to deny Ukraine the ability to produce essential foodstuffs, let alone export grain – one of Ukraine’s main economic lifelines.

Fatal Demonstrations Shake Senegal as Main Opposition Leader is Convicted

Deadly unrest has broken out across Senegal following the conviction of leading opposition figure Ousmane Sonko. Several protesters and members of the security forces have been killed or wounded by live ammunition. While the situation has stabilized somewhat since the height of clashes late last week, the potential for an escalation of violence or severe travel and communication disruptions remains very high. The situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly should Sonko be taken into custody.

So far, at least 15 people have been killed, 350 injured - 78 of whom are in serious condition – and more than 500 people have been arrested. Multiple people have been killed or wounded by live ammunition, and security forces have made heavy use of teargas. Internet and mobile communications are being regularly suspended by the government to disrupt the organization of protests via social media. Under the Macky government there has been an increase in police killings and lack of accountability.

Demonstrations erupted across the country after news broke of Ousemane Sonko’s conviction on charges of “corrupting the youth,” which carries a two-year prison sentence and precludes him from standing in the upcoming elections slated for February of 2024. The government of President Macky Sall has responded to the unrest by mobilizing riot police and the army to quell the demonstrations. The government has also been imposing an internet “curfew” from 13:00 to 02:00 (local time) since 06 June.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding all unnecessary travel to Senegal until the security situation stabilizes.
• For essential travel to Senegal in the near future, we recommend having an evacuation plan in place should the security environment deteriorate.
• For travelers and personnel currently in Senegal, we recommend using real-time intelligence monitoring.
• We strongly recommend the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Senegal.

Sonko supporters have burned, looted, or otherwise destroyed dozens of buildings, including banks, supermarkets, and – notably – the law faculty of Dakar University, which demonstrators pointed to as a symbol of a judiciary that has lost their confidence. Protesters blocked several major thoroughfares, including the Axis VDN highway leading north from Dakar, although security forces had begun the process of reopening most of these routes by Monday morning. Sonko has repeatedly called on his supporters to engage in anti-government protests since his original detention in 2021.

RECENT EVENTS

• 01 June – Ousmane Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison in absentia by a Dakar court.
• 01 June – Multiple injuries and fires were reported as students and security forces clashed at several educational facilities in Dakar.
• 01 June – Multiple buildings were set alight throughout Senegal, markets were shut down, and the first fatality was reported by Senegalese media.
• 02 June – Senegalese army was deployed to Dakar to assist police in addressing protests.
• 03 June – Senegalese media reported the death of a Gendarme from a gunshot wound.
• 04 June – Regular telecommunication blackouts in Senegal amidst ongoing protests reported.

Background

Tension in Senegal had been steadily rising throughout the trial of Ousmane Sonko, who stood accused of “corrupting the youth,” and the rape of a 20-year-old woman employed at a massage parlor. Sonko was convicted on the charge of “corrupting the youth” which entails using one’s position to have sex with someone under 21 years of age. However, he was acquitted of the rape charge, as well as of charges of intimidation and death threats. Sonko maintains that all the charges against him are politically motivated and part of Macky Sall’s attempt to remain in office unconstitutionally.

While Senegal’s presidency is constitutionally limited to two terms, President Sall has indicated that he may be planning to run for a third term. Sall argues he is eligible on the grounds that constitutional changes made in 2016 that shortened the presidential term unfairly truncated his electoral mandate. Sall’s refusal to dismiss the possibility of his running for a third term and the timing of Sonko’s legal troubles indicate a possible slide towards authoritarianism. Senegal has traditionally been a bastion of democracy and stability in the region. However, the benefits of recent economic growth have failed to materialize for large portions of Senegal’s population, particularly the youth.

LOOKING FORWARD

Religious leaders have offered to mediate talks between the Sonko and Macky camps. It is possible that these talks, combined with international pressure, may put Senegal on a path towards peaceful resolution of the crisis. Senegal’s democratic institutions are relatively robust and a descent into outright authoritarianism is not probable. The Senegalese judiciary has stated that Sonko could appeal his conviction from prison.

Rising Ethnic Tension in Kosovo Threatens to Upset Regional Stability

Violence erupted between ethnic Serb protesters and Kosovar security forces on 29 May in northern Kosovo. Diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and EU has stabilized the situation for now. But maximalist demands on the parts of both Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandr Vucic, compounded by intense political pressure in Serbia, threaten to upend a fragile regional stability.

Clashes took place in the overwhelmingly ethnically Serb municipalities of Zvecan, Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Mitrovica where at least 50 Serb protesters, and 30 NATO troops assigned to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission were injured in the confrontation. Demonstrators armed with rocks, tear gas, Molotov cocktails, and police batons attacked Kosovar security forces and NATO peacekeepers, ten of whom were left in serious but stable condition with several suffering gunshot wounds. NATO has since augmented its presence in the area with a contingent of several thousand Turkish commandos. Serbia’s armed forces are on combat alert with elements stationed near the Kosovo border. Travel within northern Kosovo and crossing between Kosovo and Serbia will be hampered by increased security presence and the probability of future clashes.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding all non-essential travel to northern Kosovo, and increased caution for all travel to both Kosovo and Serbia.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces. Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all future protest sites.

Context

The unrest was precipitated by Kosovo’s decision to proceed with municipal elections following the mass resignation of Serb representatives in November of 2022 in response to a controversial mandate requiring Kosovar license plates throughout the country. Serbian Kosovars boycotted the election with support from officials in Serbia who demanded the recognition of the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM), before elections take place. As a result of the boycott, a cohort of largely ethnically Albanian representatives was elected to the Serb majority municipalities by less than five percent of the electorate. The clashes occurred when Serb demonstrators attempted to gain access to municipal buildings where the new mayors had taken up their posts.

Kosovo, which is predominantly ethnically Albanian, unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 with NATO support. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, and Kosovar Serb’s consider themselves citizens of Serbia. A brutal 1999 war between Kosovar Albanians and Serbia characterized by ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity culminated in a NATO bombing campaign centering on Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. A NATO contingent has been present in Kosovo since the end of the war, and both countries aspire to EU membership, facts which lend significant leverage to the U.S. and EU.

Substantial diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and EU – including the immediate cancellation of a planned NATO military exercise and threats to freeze Kosovo’s path to EU and NATO membership – resulted in Prime Minister Kurti stating an openness to redoing the municipal elections. However, President Vucic, a hardline nationalist, has reiterated his demand that Kosovo recognize the ASM before any new elections are held. Recognition of the ASM is a key component of the EU path to normalization proposal tentatively agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia in March. Kurti – whose political position is characterized by uncompromising Kosovar sovereignty – has voiced continued opposition to the recognition of the ASM, citing the Republika Srpska in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina which leverages its legal status and threats of secession to exercise an outsized level of influence in Bosnian politics.

Looking Forward

The domestic political situations in both Kosovo and Serbia may exacerbate the current crisis. Vucic’s political position is dire. Two high-profile mass shootings in Serbian society have resulted in tens of thousands of Serbians taking to the streets in opposition of Vucic’s government. Large scale protests have occurred weekly since 08 May. In response, Vucic, in keeping with past nationalist leaders, is very likely to lean more heavily on energizing his nationalist base through increasingly provocative stances in Kosovo. The amelioration of the situation is further hampered by Kurti’s hardline politics, which feed into Vucic’s in a self-perpetuating cycle of vilification, rhetorical escalation, and ethnic tension.

Which side has more to gain, lose after massive Ukraine dam breach? Which side is to blame?

"This is an attritional war for Russia, which thinks it can outlast Kyiv with its superior ability to manufacture artillery and quantitative advantage in potential manpower."

In USA Today, Global Guardian Senior Intelligence Analyst Zev Faintuch discusses the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam, including the implications this significant event will have on the movement of Ukrainian forces and Russia's strategy in the war.