CONFLICT IN ISRAEL

At approximately 06:30 local time, Hamas launched a multifaceted surprise attack on Israel, with a massive rocket barrage and a mass infiltration of hit squads into Southern Israel. Dozens of Israeli civilians have been kidnapped and taken to Gaza as hostages, as Hamas terrorists took control over several townships and military installations. Over 2,200 rockets (Palestinian sources claim 5,000) were fired into Israel, with more than one-third of the Israel population impacted, including Tel-Aviv and Central Israel. Israel has declared a State of War and is mobilizing its reserves as it attempts to regain control over the communities around the Gaza Strip. The situation is rife with escalation potential with regional implications.

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

On 19 September, Azerbaijan began shelling ethnic Armenian positions in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) region around 06:30 EDT. Azerbaijan announced the offensive following the alleged deaths of six people in Azerbaijani-controlled territory due to Armenian landmines. Azerbaijan has been preparing for this operation for several weeks, having been resupplied by its patrons Turkey and Israel and conducting high-level meetings with regional players. The fighting is mostly limited to Nagorno-Karabakh and has not fully spread to the internationally recognized borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

MEXICO | GABON

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Violent Unrest Flares in Michoacan State After Cartel Alignment Shifts

The final weekend in August saw a significant escalation in the Tierra Caliente region of Michoacan state. The violent clashes, including shootouts, vehicle blockades, and fire-bombings, started in the municipality of Buenavista before spreading to Apatzingan and Uruapan. Two OXXO convenience stores were targeted with Molotov cocktails. As a result of the unrest, at least two suspects were killed, five police officers injured, and six more suspects arrested.

Global Guardian recommends low-profile, secure transportation for all travel within Mexico. At this time, we also advise against non-essential travel to Michoacan.

The violent unrest in Michoacan is the result of ongoing conflict between the Cartel Jalisco New Generation (CJNG) and Carteles Unidos, a loosely coordinated group of cartels operating in the Tierra Caliente region that includes La Familia, Templarios, and Los Miguelados, a former CJNG ally.

Los Viagras, once the strongest member of the Carteles Unidos, reportedly switched sides and formed an alliance with the CJNG in Michoacan. This came as a surprise, as Los Viagras were considered bitter enemies of the CJNG. The shifting alliances within the cartel landscape will have violent ramifications in Michoacan and elsewhere, including Guerrero, Jalisco, and Guanajuato.

Impact

Public transportation was suspended in Apatzingan amid the violence and remaining convenience stores were closed. After the weekend of violence, Mexico deployed 1,200 members of its National Guard to help enforce security in the areas of Uruapan and Apatzingan. This may lead to a temporary reduction in violence, but further conflict and unrest is likely in the medium and long term.

Outlook

Michoacan, already one of the most violent states in Mexico, could see a full-blown cartel war break out as the Viagras-CJNG alliance strengthens. The conflict centers on control of the Lazaro Cardenas port, the Tierra Caliente region, and the routes connecting these areas to the center of the country. Cartel interests in the region include methamphetamine, other synthetic drug laboratories, the extortion of agricultural producers — especially avocado and lime growers — and the illegal exploitation of mines. Additionally, chemical precursors and synthetic drugs — including fentanyl and its precursors — arrive through the port of Lazaro Cardenas. Minerals, which are often used as payment for chemicals, also leave through the port headed for China amongst other destinations.

Palace Coup in Gabon Further Normalizes Military Takeovers in Africa

On 30 August, military officers in Gabon seized power and placed President Ali Bongo under house arrest. Officers of the Presidential Guard unit announced the annulation of the previous week’s election results, closed the borders, and suspended all state institutions. Gabon’s is the eighth coup in Central and West Africa since 2020. The situation in Gabon is relatively stable, but it represents another point in a destabilizing pattern of democratic backsliding on the continent.

Current Situation

The putschists — the Committee of Transition and the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) — have begun the process of solidifying power. Gabon’s international borders and flights reopened on 02 September, though a nationwide curfew is in effect:

• 22:00-06:00: Libreville
• 18:00-06:00: Select areas on the outskirts of Libreville, between Marseille and Akanda, as well as from Nkok and Sobraga towards Owendo
• 19:30-06:00: Rest of the country

The CTRI unanimously elected General Brice Oligui Nguema — former head of the Presidential Guard — as President of the transitionary regime. The CTRI also appointed leading opposition figure Raymond Ndong Sima as prime minister. Ali Bongo’s son, Noureddin Bongo Valentin, and others associated with the Bongo regime have been arrested for corruption and treason while Jean-Remy Yama, a prominent trade union leader, has been released from prison. Prime Minister Sima announced a 24-month timeline for the restoration of democratic rule, citing the need to undo nearly 60 years of dynastic rule and cronyism.

Global Guardian recommends that those in-country carry proper identification, any relevant travel documents, and a valid Gabonese visa at all times.

• Travelers should avoid all demonstrations and large gatherings.
• Firms with travelers in Gabon should have a contingency plan in place should the junta impose new travel restrictions. Monitoring the political situation and pre-travel intelligence is recommended ahead of any travel to Gabon.

Analysis

Ali Bongo’s father, Omar Bongo, took power in 1967 and ruled until his death in 2009. Omar Bongo was a staunch ally of France and used his reign to enrich himself, his family, and his supporters. Ali Bongo continued his father’s close relationship with France, and domestic patronage system. Gabon is a major commodities exporter and features one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. However, most Gabonese live in poverty, and the country has a nearly 40% youth unemployment rate. This disparity explains the population’s largely ambivalent reaction to Bongo’s deposition.

While the coup has enjoyed some popular demonstrations of support, enthusiasm is likely being dampened by Oligui’s own association with the kleptocratic Bongo dynasty and French interests.

Ali Bongo’s election in 2009, as well as his reelections in 2016 and 2023, were marred by irregularities and accusations of fraud. Bongo’s 2016 reelection saw widespread violent demonstrations, and in 2019 officers unsuccessfully attempted to stage a coup. It is likely, given Bongo’s growing unpopularity and the population’s frustration with continued economic inequality, that this coup was a preventative measure by elements of Bongo’s inner circle to retain control of the country’s lucrative natural resources.

If this is the case, Gabon’s coup may have more in common with the coups of the Sahel than meets the eye. Both Generals Tchiani in Niger, and Hemedti in Sudan were facing dismissal — and thus discontinued access to rent — immediately before they launched their coups. This assessment is supported by the absence in Gabon of the anti-French rhetoric presented in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Oligui’s appointment of a former Eramet executive (Eramet is a major French mining concern which has indefinitely suspended Gabonese operations) as minister of petrol, indicates that Oligui and the CTRI hope to maintain economic ties to France. The CTRI has also stated that Bongo is free to travel abroad for medical treatment, likely a move to curry favor with the international community, particularly the African Union (AU), whose leadership is increasingly coming to fear for their own personal safety in light of the wave of recent coups.

Breaking Incident

Late on 08 September, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck about 50 miles south-west of the historic city of Marrakech. The earthquake led to dozens of building collapses, road blockages, and power and water outages. It was felt as far away as Spain. Rescue operations are underway in the areas surrounding the epicenter, including in the Medina of Marrakech, where historic buildings have collapsed. Global Guardian is currently conducting emergency evacuations of clients, including a group of travelers stranded at a resort damaged by the earthquake. It is the most powerful earthquake recorded in Morocco in a century.

Niger | Ecuador | Ethiopia

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Nigerien Coup Destabilizes Sahel. War Possible.

On 26 July, in Niamey, a military junta seized power and arrested President Mohamed Bazoum as well as his family. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) gave the junta until 06 August to reinstate Bazoum or face military intervention. The deadline passed and no intervention has yet taken place, but regional destabilization looms as opposing blocs form.

General Abdourahmane Tchiani — junta leader and former head of the Presidential Guard — instigated the coup amid escalating military dissatisfaction with Bazoum, and the likelihood of Tchiani’s own impending dismissal. The junta, styling itself the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland (CNSP), has instituted a no-fly zone over Niger, broken up pro-Bazoum demonstrations, and suspended the constitution. Niger’s neighbors — with the exceptions of Mali and Burkina Faso — have closed their borders and instituted sanctions on the putschists. France and the EU have also ended financial aid payments to Niger. Multiple flights have been re-routed and/or delayed to avoid use of Nigerien airspace. France, Australia, Italy, the United States, and others have evacuated their citizens from the country.

• Global Guardian recommends against all travel to Niger.
• We recommend travelers fully avoid all areas of Nigeria within 100km of the border with Niger.
• For essential travel to the region, we recommend real-time intelligence monitoring of the political situation and having an extraction plan in place.

Context

Niger is situated in the western portion of the Sahel region of Africa. The countries of the Sahel have been contending with a complex set of insurgencies based on a variety of ethno-religious and socio-economic grievances for more than a decade. Making progress in countering these insurgencies has become an important component of legitimacy for the governments of Sahelian countries.

While Niger has generally fared better than its neighbors, violence has increased across the region, with the number of conflict-related fatalities doubling since 2021. Fighting in the region, particularly with ISIS-Sahel, escalated after coups in Mali and Burkina Faso in 2020, 2021, and 2022. Following these coups, President Bazoum was publicly critical of both Niger’s military and those of its neighbors when he characterized the militants battling Sahelian state forces as “stronger and more battle-hardened" than regional armed forces. Bazoum also criticized Mali’s decision to partner with the Russian mercenary firm Wagner Group, and Burkina Faso’s decision to mobilize ethnic self-defense militias. Both policies resulted in deteriorations in the security situations.

Dissatisfaction with civilian leadership amongst the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) had been developing for years by the time General Tchiani learned of his impending dismissal. Tchiani, who had previously prevented coup attempts against Bazoum’s predecessor President Issoufou, was set to be dismissed by President Bazoum late last month following a souring of their relations. General Tchiani capitalized on the military’s grievances against Bazoum’s government and the perceived paternalism of that government’s French backers to seize power in an act of self-preservation. After a brief initial opposition, the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN), joined FDS in the coup “to avoid bloodshed.”

Analysis

The CNSP adopted an anti-French line in keeping with patterns established by Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. The choice of demonstrators in Niamey to burn French flags while waving Russian ones indicates the growing regional presence of Russia and the success of Wagner’s information campaigns. Nigeriens, like their neighbors in Burkina Faso and Mali, hold deeply negative attitudes toward France as a colonial and neo-colonial actor. The lack of progress in ameliorating the security situation despite the decade-long presence of French troops in the country, coupled with the continued operation of western commercial interests (such as uranium mines), paints a picture of a once-colonist more concerned with commercial exploitation than an equal partner in the war on terror. The CNSP has capitalized on this attitude by painting itself as a force against western colonialism as well as a more competent political force for battling the insurgency.

Alignment with the coup by senior officers of the FAN probably indicates opportunism rather than enthusiastic support for the putsch. By supporting the CNSP, senior officers position themselves to dismantle or assimilate the political and patronage systems that the ruling PNDS party had established and entrenched under Issoufou and Bazoum. They also free themselves of mediation in dealing with the French (1,500 troops) and American (1,000 troops) military missions to aid Niger with counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations.

Similar “anti-colonialist" power seizures played out in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso. Cohorts of young colonels presented themselves as champions of independence and security. However, the dismissal of western military assistance, and in Mali’s case, the introduction of Wagner fighters to the situation, has led to increased rather than abated violence.

For their part, the situation in Niger finds the leaders of the ECOWAS member states in an existentially precarious position. Niger’s is the seventh coup since 2020 in a region where most countries share the same recipe for the kind of democratic unraveling seen in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Many of the ECOWAS countries share a history of exploitation by the French, ongoing farmer-herder conflicts infused with Jihadist elements, and lack the robust and legitimate state institutions needed to prevent coups. ECOWAS’ present hardline position is understandable, then, in the face of a wave of anti-democratic and anti-western military uprisings when ECOWAS largely consists of western-backed, civilian-led democracies. ECOWAS has slated an emergency summit on 10 August in Abuja, the Nigerian capital.

Looking Forward

The outcome of this crisis, regardless of whether or not ECOWAS intervenes, will lead to regional instability. If Niger follows the pattern established by the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan, it will invite the Wagner Group to assist with security and regime stability in exchange for extractive concessions. While France’s light footprint counter-terror approach proved itself incapable of addressing the underlying political sources of conflict for its security partners, Wagner has no illusions of creating a lasting security architecture. Wagner’s continued access to the region is predicated on instability. And Wagner’s ability to extract hard value through resources, extend influence, and upset western plans are all predicated on continued access. Wagner, therefore, has no incentive — let alone capability — to address the region’s deeply rooted political issues, but will rather tend to exacerbate them.

Should ECOWAS intervene, the region, already in need of humanitarian aid, could slip into a protracted war where Nigeria, its ECOWAS partners, and their western backers face off against Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Wagner in a proxy-war. In the case of a protracted war, all of the ECOWAS states participating would be at a significantly elevated risk of coup as they shift precious military and economic resources out of their domestic arenas. The possibility of a swift victory and reinstallation of President Bazoum exists but is improbable.

Gang Violence Leads to States of Emergency, Curfews Ahead of Election

Ecuador is experiencing a wave of drug gang-driven violence that began in 2022 and is worsening. There were 4,600 homicides in 2022, an 82% increase from the previous year, as a small number of powerful drug trafficking organizations fight for control of the increasingly lucrative transport corridors in Guayas, Esmeraldas, Manabí, Los Ríos, and El Oro provinces. Through June 2023, homicides were up 74% over the same period in 2022. Shootouts, prison riots, and bombings continue in 2023 ahead of the 20 August general elections which could be directly impacted by violence, if not indirectly, as voters consider their government’s response to the violence.

• Global Guardian advises against any non-essential travel to Ecuador, and especially to the provinces of Guayas, Manabi, and Esmeraldas.
• Travel to Quito should be carefully considered.
• Global Guardian strongly recommends the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Ecuador.

Context

The rapidly increasing high crime rates in Ecuador are attributed to the country's role as a transit route for cocaine produced in Colombia and Peru. The areas around the Guayaquil port in Guayas province and Esmeraldas port in the Esmeraldas province are particularly violent, as they are the primary exit and entry points for cocaine. In February 2023, 8.8 tons of cocaine were seized at the Guayaquil port. As a result of the violence in and around these cities, the government declared states of emergency and curfews in multiple provinces and across the entire prison system. Prison riots have been a hallmark of the violence in Ecuador, with hundreds of people killed in riots at prisons in Guayaquil and Esmeraldas specifically.

The influence of Mexican cartels on the drug trade in Ecuador is exacerbating the situation. The Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) control the majority of the country's drug trade, while Los Choneros, Los Lobos, Los Lagartos, Los Chone Killers, Los Tiguerones, and the Latin Kings are among the biggest local criminal groups. As a result, crime scenes featuring bodies hanging off bridges and decapitated persons have been seen in Guayaquil.

Violent tactics associated with Mexican cartels, such as bomb blasts and ambushes, have targeted police officers, particularly in Guayas, Esmeraldas, Manta, and Manabí provinces. Bomb blasts targeting several government buildings took place in Esmeraldas in July 2023. The Ecuadorian government has since blamed the Sinaloa Cartel.

Notable Events

• 22-25 July 2023 : A prison riot in the Litoral Penitentiary in Guayaquil left 31 inmates dead and 14 injured. The riot was between rival gangs Los Lobos and Los Tiguerones.
• 23 July 2023: The mayor of Manta, Agustín Intriago, and a bystander were shot and killed in an assassination attempt.
• 24-25 July 2023: A series of bomb blasts targeted police stations and other government buildings in Esmeraldas.
  • The Ecuadorian government has blamed the bomb blasts on the Sinaloa Cartel, who is fighting for control of the drug trade in Esmeraldas province. The bombings are viewed as an attempt to intimidate the government and the police.
  • The blasts were all carried out by motorcycle riders who attached the bombs to the buildings and then fled the scene. The bombs were made with gunpowder and nails, and they caused significant damage to the buildings they targeted.
• 17 May 2023: President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly amid an impeachment trial against him over alleged embezzlement charges.
• 04 April 2023: At least four people were killed following a shooting incident and a riot in La Roca maximum security prison in Guayaquil.
• 18 November 2022: At least nine prisoners were killed in clashes between two organized crime groups inside the El Inca Prison in Quito.

LOOKING FORWARD

The spike in violence comes amid heightened political tensions. In May of this year, President Lasso dissolved the National Assembly and is ruling by decree until 20 August snap presidential and legislative elections, with runoff elections scheduled for 15 October, if needed. Unlike in neighboring Peru, the actions of Lasso were widely viewed as legitimate, despite the conspicuous timing around his impeachment trial due to allegations of embezzlement. He received support from the military and police. As such, nationwide protests did not erupt following the dissolution of government, unlike in Peru.

The election will be a referendum on the widespread rise of gang violence along with the economic situation. Ecuador suffered during the pandemic and its economy remains slow to recover amid declining export income due to low oil prices, inflationary pressures, and a strengthening U.S. dollar. Additional austerity measures may be required which would be politically unpopular, possibly leading to unrest.

Civil War Nears New and Dangerous Phase

Ethiopia declared a state of emergency following clashes in Amhara between the federal military and local armed fighters on 04 August. The situation rapidly devolving into a security and economic crisis. In late July, violence intensified in the Amhara region with clashes between the Fano militia and defected Amhara paramilitaries on one side, and federal and regional forces on the other. Escalated clashes were reported in North Shewa, North Wollo, and Gondar areas. Given the widespread resentment toward the central government and the deep ethnic and social cleavages, the current crisis threatens to widen into a broader civil conflict as it did in 2020 with the Tigray Conflict.

Several countries, including the U.S. and Canada, have issued advisories for their nationals in the Amhara region to shelter-in-place. Ethiopian Airlines flights from Addis Ababa Airport (ADD) to Bahir Dar (BJR) and Kombolcha (DSE) airports were suspended until further notice, due to the ongoing violence. Flights to Lalibela (LLI) and Gonder (GDQ) were also suspended. Mobile internet in Amhara was shut down and the A2 highway blocked at multiple points amid deadly clashes and roadblocks in Gonder, Lalibela, Bahir Dar, Kobo, Debre Tabor, Weldiya, Burie, Amanuel, Sanka, Jiga, Finote Selam, Stayish, Kulmesk, Shewa Robit, Dega Damot, Quarit, Dembecha, Dega Damot, Debre Markos, Yejube, Arefa, Wegel Tena, and other areas.

• Global Guardian advises against non-essential travel to Ethiopia.
• Personnel in the Amhara region should gather as much food and water as possible and prepare to shelter-in-place.

Context

Fano is a part-time Amharan militia without a formal command structure. It previously supported federal troops during the two-year civil war in the neighboring Tigray region, which ended with a truce in November 2022. But the relationship between Fano and the federal government has soured due to concerns over the perceived disregard for Amhara's security.

Between 02-03 August, clashes occurred between Fano fighters and Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) troops near Debre Tabor. Given the situation's gravity, Amhara's regional government has requested additional assistance from federal authorities to restore order in the region.

Recent Events

• 06 August: Ethiopia's security official confirms armed groups in Amhara have "taken control" of several districts and towns in the region and released prisoners.
• 04 August: Ethiopia declares state of emergency in Amhara.
• 26 July: Fano gunmen ambushed the federal army in Gondar.
• 14 July: Gunmen killed the police commander of Debre Berhan town (North Shewa).
• 13 July: A Tigray official reportedly said that holding a referendum while parts of the region remain under Amhara's control would be illegal.
• 06 July: Prime Minister Abiy pressed Tigray and Amhara to resolve territorial disputes through peaceful consultations. Western and parts of Southern Tigray have been under Amhara's administration since November 2020.
• 03 July: Gunmen (likely Fano) shot the police chief and his deputy in Dejen District (East Gojam Zone).

Analysis

Despite the reduction in hostilities in Tigray, the persisting tensions among various regions, armed factions, and the federal government — exacerbated by the aftermath of the civil war — pose a significant challenge to President Abiy's endeavors to consolidate authority and foster national cohesion. In May 2022, Ethiopia apprehended over 4,000 individuals in Amhara as part of an effort to weaken Fano. This action was motivated by concerns about the militia's increasing influence potentially posing a threat to the state. In the subsequent month, government forces did little to prevent the loss of numerous lives among the Amhara population, caused by an armed group in Oromia. Concurrently, security forces in Afar apprehended and relocated around Amharan 9,500 residents from a town situated along its border with Tigray.

In April 2023, Abiy made an announcement regarding the integration of all regional forces into the national police and army. This decision led to protests in Amhara, and efforts to implement this integration have encountered resistance from militias. Consequently, Abiy has pursued a combination of negotiations and coercive measures to achieve his objective. Additionally, in April 2023, Ethiopia initiated peace discussions with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), a rebel faction with a longstanding history of opposition against the government. The OLA had aligned with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front during its advance towards Addis Ababa. In June 2023, Abiy pledged to persist with military operations in Amhara until only his federal security forces remained.

Politically isolated without security guarantees, or concessions for their contributions to Abiy’s war against the Tigray, many people in Amhara feel betrayed by the central government.

Looking Forward

An increased military presence in Amhara has the potential to intensify rather than ameliorate the situation. This is especially true if the Amharan public rallies behind Fano, a scenario that is quite plausible given the considerable local backing for the militia. It is possible that Abiy will begin to enact repressive measures against ethnic Amharans in the capital and outside the Amhara region, which would inflame the situation. With Ethiopia’s ever shifting regional political dynamics, should any of the recent peace treaties with the TPLF or OLA begin to falter, a wider civil conflict is possible.

KEY TAKEAWAYS President Abiy’s divide and rule strategy has started to backfire. After “betraying” the Fano, other groups who have sided with the federal government or signed agreements with it may begin to question Abiy’s guarantees. In a country that has seen intense sectarian conflict over the last three years, the conflict in Amhara is rapidly escalating.

On 26 July, a military junta calling itself the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, head of Niger’s presidential guard unit, seized power in Niger and arrested the democratically elected President, Mohammed Bazoum. Bazoum is thought to be detained at the presidential palace. A fierce internal power struggle within the coup plotters is ongoing and the population is divided on how it views the legitimacy of the junta.

ISRAEL & WEST BANK | MALI | URUGUAY

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

West Bank Instability Points to Worsening Ground Conditions and Underscores the Increasing Likelihood of MulTi-Front War

On 03 July, Israeli forces launched a large-scale counterterrorism operation targeting militants in the West Bank city of Jenin. The operation involved over 1,000 soldiers and fighting marked the most significant flare-up between Israel and Palestinian militants since 2022, and Israel's largest operation in the West Bank since 2005. This round of violence is not isolated and is not over. Overall, the limited Israeli campaign indicates a shift in the Israeli security paradigm, one that presages heightened conflict risk in the medium term.

Starting at approximately (01:00) local time and lasting around 48 hours, the raid saw a significant number of Israeli airstrikes, some using drones and helicopters and a combined brigade of ground forces. The clash resulted in seven Palestinian deaths, over 90 Palestinian injuries, and eight wounded Israeli soldiers, including one fatality. The stated target of the operation was a “joint war room” for the Jenin Brigade, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that this will not be the last Israeli operation in Jenin.

• Global Guardian recommends against travel to the West Bank cities of Jenin and Nablus.
• We recommend pre-trip intelligence prior to all trips to Israel.
• This event highlights the increasing medium-term conflict risk in the Middle East.

Context

Owing to the weakness and unpopularity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) – (80% want President Abbas to resign) – a major paradigm shift in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict occurred in June 2021 when Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Jenin commander Jamil al-Amouri and two Palestinian security forces officers were killed during an Israeli raid. In the ensuing year, Iran saw an opportunity to capitalize on the situation and began to increase its support to its Palestinian partners.

Last year’s cyclic violence drove a chain of events that produced another Israel-Gaza war in August 2022, an Israeli decapitation operation of PIJ leadership in Gaza in May 2023, and the largest uptick in terror attacks within Israel, corresponding with more Palestinian deaths than any other point since the Second Intifada. The Palestinian Streets now overwhelmingly believes that armed “resistance” is a viable way of achieving both statehood and the dissolution of Israel, two aims that are inextricably linked.

Meanwhile, after a seven-year hiatus, rockets ostensibly launched by Palestinian factions in Southern Lebanon – but with the tacit consent, if not direct orders from Hezbollah – have been fired into Israel on several occasions in the last two years (most notably on 06 April when 34 rockets were fired in the largest salvo since the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War). These attacks highlight the increasingly tight relationships between various Palestinian militant groups and Tehran. More importantly, rocket attacks from Lebanon have now become normalized, cementing the linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the shadow war between Israel and Iran. Iran has now managed to cement the link between flare ups in West Bank and its broader campaign to eliminate Israel.

Recent Events

• 19 June – An Israeli military vehicle is severely damaged in a complex ambush in Jenin, resulting in a major shootout that necessitated the dispatch of an Israeli Apache helicopter to cover the extrication. This incident marks the first time an Israeli attack helicopter was deployed in the West Bank in over 20 years.  
• 20 June – Two Palestinian gunman shoot and kill four Israelis at a gas station in the Eli settlement, near Nablus, West Bank.
• 20 June – Israeli settlers set homes, cars, agricultural fields, and an ambulance ablaze in areas of Nablus governorate, West Bank, including Huwara and Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya.
• 21 June – A mob of extremist Israeli settlers kill one Palestinian, injure nine others, and set fire to at least 60 vehicles and 30 residences in Tumusai'ya, Ramallah, West Bank.
• 21 June – IDF drone strike targets PIJ and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade militants in a vehicle north of Jenin, West Bank for first time since 2006.
• 24 June – Israeli security forces thwart a terror attack at Qalandia Checkpoint outside Jerusalem; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claim responsibility.
• 04 July – A combined car-ramming and shooting attack injures 10 in Tel Aviv.
• 06 July – Rocket launched from Lebanon targets northern Israel; Israel responds in kind.
• 09 July – Israeli police foil stabbing attack at Giv'at Hatahmoshet light rail station in Jerusalem.

Analysis

Israeli security operations in the West Bank undermine the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy and in turn, contribute to the strengthening of Iran’s Palestinian partners, namely Hamas, PIJ, and Lion’s Den (whose fighters hail from various Palestinian factions, including Fatah’s armed wing). Yet as these various Palestinian militant groups increase their hold on the cities of Jenin and Nablus in the vacuum left by a weakened PA, they come closer to developing local weapons manufacturing that will ultimately culminate in the West Bank becoming another platform for which Iranian-assisted groups can launch rockets into Israel. But as opposed to Gaza, Southern Lebanon or Syria, the West Bank is within the Israeli heartland and no sophisticated missile defense system would be able to prevent rockets falling on Israel cities – and Israel’s sole major international airport, Ben Gurion (TLV) – from just a stone's throw away. Therein lies the dilemma: Israeli raids – necessitated by proximate security issues and the preservation of deterrence – create the conditions, namely increased support for the militant factions, that will necessitate future raids. Yet with every operation, the risk that Iran elects to open a multi-front war on Israel increases.

This latest military operation was as much about signaling to Iran and “reestablishing” deterrence as it was a response to the worsening security situation in the West Bank after the 19 June ambush on Israeli forces. Prima facie, one might conclude that mutual deterrence offers a stabilizing regional dynamic. Afterall, in the last half year or so, the Saudi/Emirati/Egyptian-Qatari rift has been mostly resolved, Syria-Arab League normalization is underway, and China brokered a diplomatic détente between Saudi Arbia and Iran. However, the opposite is true. The more Iran tightens its “ring of fire” around Israel and the more the Sunni Arab states prepare for a nuclear threshold state in Tehran, the more cornered Israel will become. And owing to Israel’s persistent existential threat and the legacy of the holocaust, Israel has set a precedent of taking unilateral military action in such circumstances.

Security to Decline Following UN Pullout Request

On 30 June, the United Nations (UN) Security Council formally voted to withdraw its 13,000 peacekeepers from Mali. The vote follows the Malian military junta’s request for the UN to withdraw. Having expelled French forces last year, the UN withdrawal will leave the military-run government with no state backing in a tough fight against Tuareg separatists and jihadist al-Qaeda affiliates who control large swaths of the northern part of the country. Instead, the junta has chosen to rely on the – now tenuous – support of the Wagner private military company. The UN withdrawal will likely result in a resurgence of jihadist forces in the north of the country and a further destabilization of the region.

The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) set a 31 December deadline to conduct an “orderly and safe” withdrawal from Mali. After MINUSMA has fully drawn down, the only force in Mali other than the Malian military will be the roughly 1,000 Wagner fighters stationed there. The swapping of UN and French security assistance to Wagner is motivated by desire to clamp down on domestic opposition ahead of elections slated for February 2024 without any form of international oversight.

• Global Guardian forecasts a decrease in stability and security; and advises those with assets in Mali to start devising evacuation plans for in-country personnel.
• Avoid all non-essential travel to Mali, particularly outside of Bamako.
• For essential travel in Bamako, use low-profile protected vehicles and executive protection.
• The proposed February 2024 elections may serve as a flashpoint event.

Context

The Junta, who took power in 2020 and 2021 coup d'etats, has come to rely more and more on the suite of security services offered by Condor Group (Wagner’s parent company). The services offered by Condor are not limited to providing mercenaries but extend to information warfare, political technology consultants, and the harassment or murder of journalists. Condor and Wagner’s presence in Mali was a major source of tension with MINUSMA and the French missions. UN officials have criticized the Malian government as having shortsightedly chosen regime security above national security.

Event Timeline

• April 2012 – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – a Tuareg separatist movement – and Jihadist-associated Fulani militias seize an area the size of France in northern Mali
• January 2013 – France launches a military intervention that stops the southward advance of the Jihadists and separatists (who had turned on one another)
• 2013 – MINUSMA intervention force is deployed
• 2015 – UN-orchestrated peace deal, the Algiers Accord, is signed between the MNLA, other separatists, and the Malian government
• 2020 – Military coup overthrows provisional government
• 2021 – Second military coup solidifies Junta control
• 2021 – UK, Germany, and Sweden withdraw from MINUSMA
• January 2022 – Wagner Group fighters begin to arrive
• 2022 – France withdraws from Mali, largely due to increased Wagner presence
• February 2023 – Mali votes not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
• June 2023 – UN votes to recall MINUSMA

LOOKING FORWARD

While Wagner fighters are often quite effective, they also have a history of human rights abuses in Mali and lack the air support, heavy weapons, and numbers necessary to provide the same level of security as the 13,000 strong MINUSMA mission. The 2015 Algiers Accord peace deal brokered by the UN with the Tuareg separatists is not likely to hold under Wagner. A coalition of separatist groups called Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) already pulled out of talks stemming from the Accord in late 2022. Should the Algiers Accord fail, the Tuareg groups will likely attempt to secure their hold on territory in the north. They may even seek some accommodation with their former allies, the largely Fulani Jihadist groups.

Previous advances by the Jihadist Jama’at Nasr al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) resulted in Timbuktu falling and advances towards Bamako. The resumption of fighting between the government and Tuareg forces could leave the door open for even further advances by JNIM. The Jihadist groups for their part could use the chaos of the upcoming 2024 election, and the Junta’s attempt to use force to subvert it, as an opportunity to galvanize support and advance south. The 1,000 Wagner fighters are not sufficient to protect against these advances and the Malian state may approach collapse.

The Junta made its decision to rely on Wagner at a time when Wagner could be reasonably interpreted to be acting with the approval and backing of the Russian state. Following Evgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny late in June, this assumption is now in question. Despite public assurances from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov that Russia will stand by its allies in Africa, it is unclear the extent to which the arms of the Russian state are willing or capable of filling Wagner’s shoes. Wagner fighters are rumored to have been drawn down in Syria and Central African Republic.

Drought leads to water Crisis in Montevideo

A multi-year drought in Uruguay has led to a water crisis impacting the capital Montevideo, putting more than 1.6 million people at risk, and raising concerns over future hazards from drought and water shortages as the earth continues to warm. The shortage caused authorities to begin mixing brackish water from the Rio de la Plata estuary with dwindling fresh water supplies, triggering warnings to those with kidney disease, high blood pressure, and other issues. In June, thousands of people took to the streets of Montevideo to protest the water shortage and mixing of salty brackish water into drinking supplies. The government is attempting to mitigate the risks by importing bottled water, drilling wells, and constructing new reservoirs.

• Global Guardian advises against drinking the tap water in Uruguay and recommends monitoring the availability of bottled water prior to travel in the short term.
• Ongoing shortages could lead to severe water rationing in households and business for bathrooms, kitchens, laundry, etc.
• Serious unrest is possible should the water crisis escalate.

Context

Uruguay is in the midst of a historic multi-year drought, with high temperatures and limited rainfall culminating in a water crisis in the capital region. Water levels in the Pasa Severino reservoir are at just 10% of capacity according to the Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE). Periodic rainfall will not be enough to replenish the reservoir. At least two inches of water per day over a 30-day period are required for water levels to recover. In addition to the drinking water crisis, farmers are struggling with declining crop yields and livestock problems.

The government has taken the following steps to mitigate the crisis:

• Importing more than $12,000,000 a month in bottled water for residents of the capital region
• Eliminating the tax on bottled water
• Purchasing multiple 150,000-liter desalination plants to be used for hospitals and other critical locations
• Digging new wells in Montevideo
• Evaluating a new reservoir project on the San Jose River

There have been multiple protests against the government’s handling of the water shortage, with some blaming ranchers and others accusing “exploitative” industries for using too much water.

Looking Forward

On 06 July, Uruguay’s Congress unanimously approved the Water Emergency Fund to finance access to bottled water among other measures. On 08 July, Argentine President Alberto Fernandez offered help to Uruguay in the form of a mobile water treatment plant, supplies, and personnel. Uruguay’s President Luis Lacalle Pou thanked his counterpart but turned down the offer for the moment, claiming the situation was dynamic and that it had recently rained. Without serious rainfall, the water crisis will continue, and the government will be forced to buy bottled water for the entire capital region.

KEY TAKEAWAYS Montevideo is the first capital city to effectively run out of drinking water despite Uruguay being the first country in the world to enshrine access to water as a fundamental right in a 2004 constitutional amendment. The government is now spending tens of millions of dollars each month importing bottled water, building water desalination plants, and digging new wells. The water crisis highlights the risks from severe drought and rising temperatures which lead to increased water consumption. Other countries facing near-to-medium term water crisis risks will soon face the prospect of unrest and high costs of importing water without prompt action.

 

On 29 June, violent confrontations in France continued for a third straight night, as tensions between protesters and police spiked. The demonstrations spread to Paris Intramuros (Paris proper), as well as Brussels and Belgium, where 64 people were arrested. Protesters attacked police stations, transportation infrastructure, and government offices across the country. Multiple commercial centers, shops, banks, and ATMs were looted and set alight. At least three police stations were burned down. Roughly 875 people were arrested overnight, of whom more than 307 were in the Paris prefecture. At least 249 police were injured by fireworks, Molotov cocktails, rocks, and other weapons. Violence will likely continue to escalate this weekend.

Violent confrontations between protesters and police have erupted in scores of suburban municipalities across France. On 27 June a motorcycle police officer killed a 17-year-old resident of Nanterre – Nahel M. – via gunshot at close range. A video clip of the incident – which contradicted police reports of Nahel using his vehicle as a weapon – subsequently went viral, inspiring protests across the country.

In a surprise move, Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin halted the advance of his forces on Moscow and announced an end to hostilities in an apparent deal with President Putin brokered by Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko. In return for cessation of hostilities and movement of Wagner forces back to their bases in Russia and Ukraine, Putin agreed not to prosecute Prigozhin, dropping all charges, and allowing him to effectively retire in Belarus. The deal also grants some level of amnesty for Wagner forces, who will now have the option to sign contracts directly with the Ministry of Defense. It is likely that Prigozhin was motivated by his own survival and his putsch was an attempt to preserve Wagner's independence and freedom of action. The status of Wagner's operations abroad remains unknown.